Re: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 20 May 2005 11:55:34 +0200

Le 19-mai-05, à 21:18, John M a écrit :

> Without trying to defend Robert Rosen, his (unlimited) natural systems
> (maximum models = the THING itself, not a model) are (in his words)
> "not
> Turing -computable", I think that is different from Bruno's unlimited
> 'comp'.

I would like to insist on this key point: comp entails that first
person reality, whatever it is, is NOT COMPUTABLE. (and the UDA shows
that physics is among the 1-realities).
If I am a machine then whatever I am embedded in, CANNOT BE CAPTURED
BY ANY PROGRAM, with the exception of the UD which does not really
captured reality as we can know it, because the capture in provably NOT
EFFECTIVE. The UD generates all the machine "dreams" which by highly
non trivial interference (not the quantum one but the comp one)
generates a non computable "solidity".

To understand COMP = to understand we are infinitely more ignorant than
we could have thought. And this aspect of comp appears still more
clearly in the "interview" of the Loebian machine which is the most
modest being ever conceived until now (to my knowledge).

John, I'm afraid you still have a reductionist, pre-godelian,
understanding of machine. Or perhaps, by inattention you are coming
back to such a reductionist conception of machine. Since Goedel 1931
such a reductive view of machine is just wrong. Godel's theorem is the
realisation that we just don't know what universal machine are, what
they are able to do. It makes us humble!

I insist because that's a widespread misconception. The real miracle is
that those machine dreams are still interfering in a way which makes
the appearance of physical reality locally testable, inluding the
testability of comp itself.

And so I do agree with ROSEN's conclusion that "nature" is not
computable. But I extracted this by what amounts essentially to a
self-finiteness assumption (that's comp) where Rosen got it by assuming
at the start that he is natural and by assuming at the start that
nature is not computable. I don't do that because I have never
understand what the word "Nature" means in that context, except as some
dogmatic oversimplification of Aristotle physics and theology.

Received on Fri May 20 2005 - 06:36:01 PDT

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