Le 19-mai-05, à 14:44, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
> [quoting Stathis]
>> >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
>> >duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I
>> >"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I
>> >don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new
>> >system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and
>> >in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person
>> >and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it
>> >doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't
>> >think you can deny it.
>>
>> I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
>> difference
>> between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't
>> think
>> anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even
>> with comp
>> there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does
>> not seem
>> to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience.
>>
>> Jonathan Colvin
>
> Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully
> include what it is like to be that thing?
What do you mean by " include" ? Does the artificial brain proposed by
your doctor "includes" you ?
In a 1-person sense: yes (assuming c.)
In a 3-person sense: no.
OK?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu May 19 2005 - 09:31:48 PDT