Le 13-mai-05, à 05:39, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> Brent writes
>
>> I think that an observer must be physically instantiated - that seems
>> well
>> supported empirically. As it is used a "observer moment" seems to
>> mean a unit
>> of subjective experience. That there is an "observer", i.e.
>> something with
>> continuity over many such subjective experiences, must be an
>> inference or a
>> construct within the theory.
>
> Personally, I would agree. But many here contend that abstract
> patterns---mathematical stings, really---can do *so* much cross-
> referencing and quoting of each other that a form of paste obtains
> that wields them in to something capable of having experiences.
> But a familiar abstract object, namely the real numbers between zero
> and one, evidently already does all of that (considering the decimal
> or binary expressions), and so I'm not sure what remains for the
> more abstruse inhabitants of Platonia to do.
Such critics can be addressed to any "block-universe" view of physics,
not just mathematical platonia.
>
>>> Yes, that's the simplest explanation! We have to suppose that
>>> physical objects continue to encode previously gained information
>>> in the default case.
>>
>> I don't know that "we have to". I've know idealists who suppose
>> that our memories are part of our immaterial spirits. But they
>> have a hard time explaining the limitations of memory.
>
> Such idealists have a hard time being credible at all, if you
> ask me.
>
>>> But what John was perhaps saying---and what I would certainly
>>> claim along with all the adherents of "observer-moments", I
>>> think---is that any particular version of you at any particular
>>> moment is not conscious of the facts encoded in all your memories.
>>> Hence the idea that an observer-moment is the net intersection
>>> across the multiverse and across other planetary systems of a
>>> particular sense-perception experience of a particular person.
>>
>> But if, for each subjective experience, there is no way to uniquely
>> associate
>> it with a sequence of subjective experiences, i.e. every such
>> experience has
>> many predecessors and successors, then I don't see how such sequences
>> can
>> constitute a particular person(s).
>
> I agree. That is, freed of memory, just how are all those subjective
> moments linked in a particular ordered sequence? I also agree with
> your statement, when *persons* (as you write) are being considered.
> I'll admit that there is something---but not very much---associated
> with a person that has nothing to do with the person's memories.
>
>> It seems in these discussions that the existence of such sequences
>> corresponding to a particular person, an "observer", is taken for
>> granted. It is a natural model given that observers are physical
>> things - but it is problematic if physics is thrown out and you
>> start from nothing but "observer moments".
>
> Well said. A natural model does give us that observers are
> physical things, or at least *necessarily* instantiated in
> physical things. And I agree that starting from nothing but
> observer-moments won't take us any further than it took
> William James http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/
>
> I can't blame the ancients and moderns up to the 19th century
> for being dualists. It seemed utterly impossible that mere
> atoms in motion could give rise to such as we. But the painful
> ---and painstaking---defeat of vitalism achieved finally in
> the 20th century leaves it the simplest hypothesis by far to
> say that we are machines. Our "souls" and we arise by natural
> means, just as do streams and mountains.
Look at my recent posts to the FOR-LIST, which I have cc-send to the
everything-list just two minutes ago. I agree the abandon of vitalism
is a progress. And it is true that natural science has explained
feature like self-reproduction, animal motion, energy transformation
(sun -> living matter) and so one. But it is just erroneous to conclude
that the mind-body problem has been solved. And then if we are really
"digital machine", I offer a case that materialism will be abandoned
from purely rational consideration. Matter? A lasting aristotelian
superstition ...
>
> Observer-moments seems to arise simply from observers,
Except that nobody has ever succeed in explaining how the 1-person
observer moment can arise from any 3-person description of an observer.
And myself and independently Maudlin has made a strong case why, with
the comp hyp it is just impossible to make such a link. Reference can
be found here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/lillethesis/these/
node79.html#SECTION001300000000000000000
> and
> observers arise simply from highly intelligent mammals (or
> aliens) who can think about their own thinking. Unless you
> want (which is probably a good idea) to regard even
> photographic plates and other matter upon which impressions
> can be made as *observers*.
>
> Lee
>
>
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Fri May 13 2005 - 03:03:00 PDT