I agree with you Stathis. That's why I think MWI, QTI and COMPI lead to
the Relative SSA, and relative immortality.
The SSA you mention is the Absolute SSA which does not make sense, imo.
Bruno
Le 11-mai-05, à 14:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Bruno,
>
>> Le 10-mai-05, à 12:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>> I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we
>>>> are
>>>> guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the
>>>> observer-moment
>>>> concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments
>>>> where
>>>> we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we
>>>> are
>>>> at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck.
>>>
>>> Aren't the above two sentences contradictory? If it is guaranteed
>>> that somewhere in the multiverse there will be a million year old
>>> Hal observer-moment, doesn't that mean that you are guaranteed to
>>> experience life as a million year old?
>>
>> With some ASSA perhaps, but with the RSSA it makes sense only if
>> those "old Hal OM." have the right relative proportion to the young
>> one.
>> where:
>> SSA self-sampling assumption (by Nick Bolstrom)
>> ASSA idem but conceived as absolute
>> RSSA idem but conceived as relative
>> OM = Observer Moment
>
> Is the SSA even relevant here? The SSA says that I should consider
> each OM as if randomly sampled from the set of all possible OM's. In
> the MWI, although it is certain that there will be a million year old
> version of me, the distribution of OM's is greatly skewed towards
> younger versions of me, so that the measure of million year old
> versions is very close to zero; in fact, it should have the same
> numerical value as the probability of my reaching this advanced age in
> a single world interpretation of QM. Therefore, if I pick an OM at
> random from my life, it is extremely unlikely that it will be one
> where I find myself to be a million years old.
>
> I accept the above reasoning as sound, but I don't think it disproves
> QTI. The probability that a randomly chosen OM from all possible OM's
> available to me will be experienced as a million year old version of
> me is *not* the same as the probability that I will experience life as
> a million year old at some point. The former probability may be very
> close to zero, but the latter probability, if MWI is true, should be
> exactly one.
>
> Here is a somewhat analogous example to show the difference. Suppose
> that there is only one universe and that my life expectancy in this
> universe is about one hundred years. Consider the one second time
> interval between August 10 2005, 10:00:00 AM and August 10 2005,
> 10:00:01 AM. Counting all the one second intervals available to me in
> a one century lifespan, assuming I sleep eight hours a day, gives
> about 2 billion. The probability that a random one second long OM in
> my life coincides with the above interval on August 10 is therefore
> about 1/2 billion. The probability that I will live through this time
> interval, on the other hand, is hopefully very close to one.
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
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Received on Wed May 11 2005 - 05:22:19 PDT