Re: many worlds theory of immortality

From: John Collins <johnhcollins.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 11 May 2005 11:22:12 +0100

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
"
>Le Mardi 10 Mai 2005 19:13, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
>> And in terms of your question, I would not act as though I expected to
> >be guaranteed a very long life span, because the measure of that universe
> >is so low compared to others where I don't survive.
>>
> >Hal Finney
>
>Hi,
>
>but by definition of what being alive means (or being conscious), which is
to
>experience observer moments, even if the difference of the measure where
you
>have a long life compared to where you don't survive is enormous, you can
>only experience world where you are alive... And to continue, I find it
very
>difficult to imagine what could mean being unconscious forever (what you
>suggest to be likely).

>Quentin Anciaux
"
..You are working from the assumtion that each person has some sort of
transcendental identity that experiences these observer moments, but I would
think it more likely that these would be included in the observer moment,
with memories being distinguished from "instantaneous" thoughts just by
their being repeated several (or even millions of) times. As an
illustration, try and remember what you had for dinner on your fifth
birthday. Whether you remember or not, tou only know if you remember when
you try to recall it, so you can't really pretend the piece of information
is continuously present. Even the "knowledge" of your own name (which I
suspect is made up, anyway) will have only a finite (or countable, if you
live forever) number of instantiations.

Chris Collins
Received on Wed May 11 2005 - 03:22:12 PDT