You're right in one way, but there *is* a difference between what we
experience in the first person and everything else. It is *possible* to
doubt everything about the external world, but it is *impossible* to doubt
that you are having a first person experience/ a thought/ an
observer-moment/ whatever you want to call it.
-- Stathis Papaioannou
>From: "Brent Meeker" <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
>Subject: RE: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
>Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 22:57:22 -0000
>
>There are many things we can't test conclusively - in fact there is nothing
>we
>*can* test conclusively. All scientific knowledge is provisional. So I
>don't
>see why you jump from the fact that we can't conclusively test for other
>minds
>to saying that we take it on faith. I'd say that I have a lot of evidence
>for
>other minds.
>
>Brent Meeker
>
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden]
> >Sent: Sunday, May 08, 2005 5:47 AM
> >To: stephenk1.domain.name.hidden
> >Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
> >
> >
> >Dear Stephen,
> >
> >COMP is basically a variant of the familiar "Problem of Other Minds",
>which
> >is not just philosophical esoterica but something we have to deal with in
> >everyday life. How do you know that all your friends and family are
>really
> >conscious in the way you are conscious, and not merely zombies who behave
>as
> >if they are conscious? There isn't any empirical test that can help you
> >decide the answer to this question conclusively; in the final analysis,
>you
> >assume that other people have minds as a matter of faith. This troubles
>me
> >as much as it troubles you, but alas, there is nothing we can do about
>it.
> >
> >--Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> >>From: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
> >>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
> >>CC: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> >>Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
> >>Date: Sat, 7 May 2005 10:27:45 -0400
> >>
> >>Dear Stathis,
> >>
> >> It is exactly this seeming requirement that we accept COMP by faith
>and
> >>demand no possibility of empirical falsification that troubles me the
>most.
> >>For me, a theory must make predictions that "might be confirmed to be
> >>incorrect" otherwise all one has, at best, is the internal consistensy
>of
> >>the theory. In light of Goedel's theorems, the utility of such theories
>to
> >>answer questions is in doubt.
> >> There must be always some way for independent observers to agree
>upon
> >>the falsifiable implications of a theory. Here we are considering a
>theory
> >>of observers themselves...
> >>
> >>Stephen
> >>
> >>----- Original Message ----- From: "Stathis Papaioannou"
> >><stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
> >>To: <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
> >>Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> >>Sent: Saturday, May 07, 2005 9:13 AM
> >>Subject: Re: Everything Physical is Based on Consciousness
> >>
> >>
> >>snip
> >>>OK, I agree. AI research is an experimental science. It may or may not
>be
> >>>possible to build and program a computer so that it behaves like an
> >>>intelligent and self-aware entity. Even if this difficult feat is
> >>>eventually accomplished, there will then be the philosophical questions
> >>>casting doubt on whether it is *really* conscious. This is the old
>problem
> >>>of possibility of knowing whether other people really have minds like
>us,
> >>>or whether they are just zombies acting like conscious beings.
>Ultimately,
> >>>and regretfully, we can only be sure that we ourselves are conscious,
>and
> >>>we have to take the existence of other minds on faith. However, if we
> >>>believe that other humans are conscious because they seem to behave
>like
> >>>we do, but refuse to believe that a computer which behaves in the same
>way
> >>>(i.e. passes the Turing test) is conscious, then we are being
> >>>inconsistent, and it is this inconsistency which I have called
>biological
> >>>chauvinism.
> >>>
> >>>Having said that, it was not the purpose of my original post to show
>that
> >>>observer-moments are Turing emulable. Rather, it was to show that Bruno
> >>>Marchal's UDA can work without explicitly defining or explaining
> >>>consciousness. I believe Bruno himself has aknowledged that the
> >>>computational hypothesis (which he calls "comp") may ultimately have to
>be
> >>>taken as a matter of faith. This sort of bothers me because I spent a
> >>>large part of my adolescence heaping scorn on religion and other
> >>>faith-based belief systems, but I can't do anything about it.
> >>>
> >>>--Stathis Papaioannou
> >>
> >
> >_________________________________________________________________
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Received on Mon May 09 2005 - 02:09:39 PDT