Re: Many worlds theory of immortality

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2005 09:14:13 +0200

Le 04-mai-05, à 01:53, Russell Standish a écrit :

> On this list, we seem to have two fairly clear camps: those who
> identify observer moments as the fundamental concept, and those who
> regard relationships between observer moments with equal ontological
> status.

OK. As you know I take the relationship into account.


>
> With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious observer necessarily
> experiences a sequence of related observer moments (or even a
> continuum of them).

With my COMP postulate I say the same. The purely mathematically state
transition function plays the role of your TIME. We do experience a
continuum of observer moments simultaneously (provably with comp) but
just because we are related to a continuum of execution in the
"mathematical" execution of the UD.


> To argue that observer moments are independent of
> each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, the measure of
> each observer moment is relative to the predecessor state, or the RSSA
> is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, each observer
> moment has an absolute measure, the ASSA.

OK. You know I "belong" to the RSSA.

>
> On this postulate (which admittedly still fails rigourous statement,
> and is not as intuitive as one would like axioms to be), hinges the
> whole QTI debate, and many other things besides. With TIME, one has
> the RSSA and the possibility of QTI. With not-TIME, one has the
> ASSA,and Jacques Mallah's doomsday argument against QTI is valid. See
> the great "RSSA vs ASSA debate" on the everything list a few years
> ago.
>
> Now I claim that TIME is implied by computationalism.

The "illusion" of time (and even of different sort of time like
1-person subjective duration to local 3-person parameter-time) is
implied by comp.

> Time is needed
> for machines to pass from one state to another, ie to actually compute
> something.

I guess our divergence relies on the word "actually". If you need such
a "concrete time" then you need even a "universe". Such actuality is an
indexical. The only time I need is contained in arithmetical truth, in
which I can embed all the block-space of all computational histories.


> Bruno apparently disagrees, but I haven't heard his
> disagreement yet.

I am not sure I understand your TIME. Is it physical or mathematical?

Cheers,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Wed May 04 2005 - 03:18:12 PDT

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