> Norman wrote:
>If it is true that "In infinite time and infinite space,
>whatever can happen, must happen, not only once but an
>infinite number of times," then what does probability mean?
>In your example below, there must be an infinity of worlds
>where Colin Powell is president and an infinity of worlds
>where your 6-year old niece is president. Are you saying that
>the Colin Powell infinity is bigger than the 6-year old niece infinity?
Yes.
Or;
It takes an infinite amount time for everything to happen an infinite number
of times. Therefore there is no time T where anything has happened an
infinite number of times (I'm assuming T= infinity has no "real" meaning in
any world). At any *particular* time T (at which we or anyone exists),
nothing will have happened an infinite number of times; thus at any time T
there will be far more universes where Colin Powell is president than my six
year old neice.
Jonathan Colvin
>>Mark Fancey writes:
>>> Did accepting and understanding the MWI drastically alter your
>>> philosophical worldview? If so, how?
>>
>>Hal: I don't know if I would describe it as a drastic alteration,
>>but I do tend to think of my actions as provoking a continuum
>>of results rather than a single result. <snip>
>
>>Another way it has influenced my thinking is about future
>>indeterminacy.
>>I now believe, for example, that there is no meaning to
>>certain questions that people ask about future conditions.
>>For example, who will be the next president? I don't think
>>this question is meaningful. Many people will be the next
>>president. My consciousness spans multiple universes where
>>different people will be president.
>
>But there are likely many many more universes where Colin
>Powell is the next
>president than there are where my 6 year old neice is. So it
>is a meaningful
>question.
>
>>Any question like this which presupposes only one future has a
>>similar problem. Another one we often hear is, are we in a
>>speculative bubble in real estate (or stocks, or whatever).
>>That's a meaningless question.
>>Bubbles can only be defined retrospectively. If prices fall,
>>then we were in a bubble; if they don't, then we weren't. But
>>both futures exist.
>>I live in worlds where we are in a bubble and worlds where we
>>are not in a bubble. The question has no answer.
>
>But again we can make a probabilistic argument that there are many more
>universes where house prices continue climbing than there are where all
>houses become worthless tomorrow.
Received on Thu Apr 28 2005 - 02:05:17 PDT
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