RE: many worlds theory of immortality

From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2005 14:26:43 -0400

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer writes:
>
>>>[Stathis]
>>>There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the
>>>probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if
>>>implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is
>>>the probability that the actual hardware will work according to
>>>specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively
>>>arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part
>>>of the specification!
>
>>[Jesse]
>>I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving
>>software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that
>>destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and
>>more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into
>>computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the
>>universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average.
>>Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being
>>destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into
>>account all possible causes of failure, including software problems,
>>destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some
>>other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you.
>
>>>[Stathis]
>>>Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new
>>>home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The
>>>computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably
>>>try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that
>>>your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you
>>>to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed
>>>to.
>
>>[Jesse]
>>But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of
>>"ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be
>>true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point
>>in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies
>>around in the giant computing network forever.
>
>You seem to be treating the proposed ever-decreasing failure rate per clock
>cycle as if it is something that will just happen inexorably once the
>denizens of the far future decide to build this computer.

No, I'm just suggesting that it's possible that once these far future people
have gotten a good start on building this ever-increasing *network* of
computers, the probability of every single computer in the system breaking
down may, in an average world, be decreasing geometrically, perhaps for no
other reason that the number of computers is increasing geometrically as
more and more of the universe is converted into computing machines (which in
a way would be no more surprising than the idea that the population tends to
increase geometrically when resources are unlimited and death rates are
low). This need not happen "inexorably" since it wouldn't be true in every
single history, I'm just suggesting the average pattern if you look at all
possible futures stemming from a given time may involve such a geometric
decrease in failure probability. Are you suggesting it is somehow logically
impossible that the *average* pattern would be a geometric one?

>You may as well say that in the future, there will be computers with a mean
>time between failure of 10^10^100 years, or whatever arbitrarily large
>number you choose.

Sure, if you have a decentralized network of computers like the internet,
then no matter what the average failure rate of an individual computer in
the network, you can keep the failure rate of the entire network as
arbitrarily low as you want by making the number of computers in the network
sufficiently large.

>The problem is not in conceiving of such super-machines, it is in the
>details of design and implementation.

Again, it need not be a question of super-machines, just a question of sheer
numbers.

>I imagine that in the future there may be multiple attempts to build
>computers which will squeeze an infinite period of subjective time into a
>finite period of real time, in the way you have described,

I wasn't necessarily suggesting an infinite number of computations in a
finite physical time a la Tipler...an infinite number of computations in an
infinite physical time a la Dyson would be fine too (to inhabitants of the
simulation it wouldn't make any difference).

>and like any other engineering project, the success rate will increase with
>increasing experience and resources, but even the "last gasp" effort in the
>moment before the big crunch will only succeed in an infinitesimally small
>proportion of multiverse branches.

I don't see why it is logically impossible that it could succeed in a
non-infinitesimal proportion of multiverse branches, due to an on-average
geometric decrease in the probability of the whole system breaking down.

Jesse
Received on Tue Apr 19 2005 - 15:48:22 PDT