RE: many worlds theory of immortality

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 15:54:40 -0000

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden]
>Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 1:28 PM
>To: meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
>Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>
>
>Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> >-----Original Message-----
>> >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden]
>> >Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 1:03 AM
>> >To: HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden; everything-list.domain.name.hidden.com
>> >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>> >
>> >
>> >Hal Ruhl wrote:
>> >
>> >>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>> >>concurrently.
>> >>
>> >>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality
>>is
>> >>to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
>> >>that branch.
>> >
>> >I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should be able to
>>jump
>> >between branches, between physical locations and across long periods of
>> >time.
>>
>>Why do you assume that - which seems contrary to experience? It seems that
>>consciousness is part of the function of material (i.e. brains).
>
>I feel that I am the same person as I was five years ago even though hardly
>any of the atoms in my body are the same now as then. The body and brain of
>the younger me have disintegrated as completely as if I had died and been
>cremated. Certainly, the change has been gradual over time, but the fact
>remains that I am now comprised of different matter, with different
>spacetime coordinates, in a configuration only approximately copying that of
>my younger self. Moreover, my reconstructed brain provides me with only
>approximately the same memories as my younger self, in addition to the newer
>memories. Without resorting to science fiction thought experiments (mind
>uploading, teleportation etc.), I think this demonstrates that consciousness
>and personal identity are malleable and mobile, even if you restrict
>yourself to implementation on brains.

But there is a causal, material chain connecting your brain today and your
younger brain. If your brain suffers a concussion or anesthesia, do you
suppose your consciousness goes somewhere else?

Brent Meeker
Received on Mon Apr 18 2005 - 19:48:29 PDT