Le 18-avr.-05, à 09:04, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
> I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all
> and
> only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and
> whether it
> has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not
> sure
> that Godel is relevant in that context; but then I'm not sure that it's
> irrelevant either. In this context statements like the descriptions of
> the
> states of cellular automata *can* be seen as describing arithmetical
> truths.
> No?
That's correct. Any relative description of anything digital can be seen
as describing some arithmetical truth.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Mon Apr 18 2005 - 06:22:24 PDT