RE: many worlds theory of immortality

From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 02:25:34 -0400

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
>
>Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
>
>>>No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
>>>bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
>>>some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends,
>>>for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a
>>>very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break
>>>down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down -
>>>eventually.
>>
>>Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way
>>from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon,
>>whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant
>>distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows
>>for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding
>>civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a
>>catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in
>>the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any
>>point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of
>>the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4.
>>In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last
>>forever.
>
>It is possible that the probability of the computer breaking down decreases
>geometrically with time, as you say. However, as t->infinity, it is
>nevertheless increasingly likely to deviate from this ideal behaviour, and
>the measure of branches of the multiverse in which it does will approach
>zero. Remember, it is not the probability in any single branch which is
>important (in fact, in the MWI that would be a meaningless concept), but
>the measure across all branches.

It may be more likely to deviate from this ideal behavior, but it could
deviate by approaching zero probability of breakdown faster than the ideal
behavior predicts, instead of slower; when I said that the probability would
be 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., I meant the *average* you get when you sum all
possible future histories from that point, including both the histories
where at some later time the probability was approaching zero even faster
than predicted by the 1/8+1/16+... pattern along with the histories where at
some later time it was approaching zero slower, or the probability of
breakdown was even increasing. Since it's an average, that means that out of
all future histories stemming from that time, in 3/4 of them civilization
will never break down.

Jesse
Received on Mon Apr 18 2005 - 02:27:15 PDT