RE: many worlds theory of immortality

From: Jonathan Colvin <jcolvin.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 17 Apr 2005 18:25:15 -0700

>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>>concurrently.
>>
>>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
>immortality
>>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
>>inherent in that branch.
>
>Stathis: I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should
>be able to jump between branches, between physical locations
>and across long periods of time. I have not made up my mind
>whether it can also jump backwards in time, i.e. if a moment
>can be experienced as being in your future when in the real
>world it is actually implemented in the past.

That is, presumably, assuming that the Principle of Indifference is correct.
I've got an issue with the PofI though; the problem of identity, or, how do
we decide whether a consciousness in a different branch or time is "mine"?
Is all that is required is that an identical brain-state exist elsewhere or
elsewhen? Then, as you've noted, there is an issue of sequencing. Why assume
a jump must always be forward in time? With no physical continuity between
brain-states, our consciousness might get stuck in an endless loop:
..W>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>... etc. I suppose that would be an immortality of
sorts, albeit rather a hellish one; but I suppose we wouldn't "realize" we
were stuck.

Jonathan Colvin
Received on Sun Apr 17 2005 - 21:31:54 PDT