RE: many worlds theory of immortality

From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400

>From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
>To: lasermazer.domain.name.hidden, everything-list.domain.name.hidden.com
>Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>>>You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be
>>>the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the
>>>brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years
>>>during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient
>>>company!
>>
>>What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more
>>likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last
>>as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself
>>approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing
>>entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that
>>everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in
>>some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to
>>an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like
>>that.
>>
>>Jesse
>
>The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW
>is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will
>survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are
>surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it
>must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only
>one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die
>and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend
>will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the
>probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero.

For any given friend, sure. I thought you meant "alone" in the sense of
having no other sentient beings to talk to. Also, if you live in some sort
of "Omega Point" scenario where the computing power available to
civilization grows without bound (not necessarily in the specific way Tipler
proposed), maybe it'd be possible to reconstruct lost friends by simulating
all possible past histories of the universe up until a certain time, then
looking at the subset of universes that produced a being with your exact
mental state at that time, so you can find a past history that's consistent
with your memories.

Jesse
Received on Thu Apr 14 2005 - 04:06:58 PDT