Re: "Free Will Theorem"

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 10:07:44 +0200

Le 11-avr.-05, à 08:08, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

> Norman Samish wrote:
>> To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely
>> predictable.
>> To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's
>> actions
>> must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
>> fundamental level, this must be quantum indeterminacy.
> This is not what most people mean by "free will". If I ask you to pick
> one of two cards, and you are initially reaching for the left card but
> then a random quantum event causes a muscle spasm in your arm which
> makes you to point to the right card instead, would you say this was
> an example of free will on your part?

That random event would not help indeed. But it does not answer Samish
question. Actually I agree with you. I don't see how any indeterminacy
could be used in free-will. I agree also with George and Russell on the
fact that responsability (in which I believe) has nothing to do with
Actually I am not sure I can put any meaning on the word "free-will".
My old defense (in this and other list) was just a defense of the
notion of will. If someone can explain me how he/she distinguish
free-will from will, I would be glad.


Received on Mon Apr 11 2005 - 04:16:22 PDT

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