Re: Belief Statements

From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2005 11:08:33 -0500

Dear Hal,

    How do your "kernels" fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's "time
capsules"?

    There seems to be a constant attempt by many to rework the idea of an a
priori ordering, such that the universe - taken as a 3rd person
representadum, or the conscious experience - the 1st person representadum,
exist a priori and any notion of transitivity and change are merely some
kind of illusion. This is, IMHO, an attempt to derive Becoming from Being.
    Why not try something different? Like deriving Being from Becoming?

Stephen

----- Original Message -----
From: "Hal Ruhl" <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>
To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 11:16 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


> Hi Stephen:
>
> At 10:49 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
>>Dear Hal,
>>
>> What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing
>> required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency?
>
> It is not a logical inconsistency. What I am trying to convey is that
> each step in the sequence pays no attention to the prior sequence. That
> is a maximal inconsistency of progression to the sequence. "Random" and
> "independent" to me convey a testable behavior and I want to point to an
> untestable progression.
>
> >Both options, it seems to me, require checking of some kind! All that is
> left is randomness, there is no such >a thing as a true "test for
> randomness" that is finitely implementable!
>
> The embedding system component - the All - is already infinite, so an
> infinite test is containable therein.
>
> >If we accept that option then we have to explain the apparent continuity
> that occurs in the 1st person aspect >of the path.
>
> Such a path will link arbitrarily long strings of kernels that give the
> appearance of 1st person continuity, and this appearance can hold even if
> many other kinds of kernels intervene - the 1st person could not detect
> this.
>
> Hal Ruhl
>
Received on Sun Jan 30 2005 - 11:10:42 PST