At 09:41 27/01/05 +0000, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >-----Original Message-----
> >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden]
> >Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM
> >To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> >Subject: Re: Belief Statements
> >With comp the
> >mind-body relation is one-one
> >in the body -> mind direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It
> >is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch).
> >
> >Bruno
>
>This seems doubtful to me. A mind (all minds we know of) think of themselves
>as associated with a body and they are so associated. As I understand your
>"comp hypothesis" it is that a mind-body can fork into two or more mind-body
>pairs - but it's no longer the same mind; so the relation is still one-to-one.
>
>Brent Meeker
Only after the forking. Before it is, from a measure point of view, as if
you were
simultaneously in two equivalent computations (without this no
interference-like
phenomena would ever be possible). Remember the Y = II law. A forking leads
two a multiplication of the computational history.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Fri Jan 28 2005 - 06:07:52 PST