Re: Belief Statements

From: Stathis Papaioannou <>
Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2005 09:29:43 +1100

On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote:

>At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular
>>bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, "I think,
>>therefore I am", then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in
>>the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the same moment
>>of consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet user or anyone
>>other than the simulated being himself is or can be aware of this?
>But from the point of view of the simulated being himself he cannot have
>the slightest clue about
>which executions he is supported by. He is dispersed in 2^aleph0
>computational histories and
>he can only bet on its most probable consistent extensions. You always talk
>like if the mind body relation was one-one, when with comp although you
>still can attach a mind to a ["piece of relative
>object" appearing in your most probable histories] the mind of "the piece
>of relative object" cannot
>attach an object to itself, only an infinity of such objects. With comp the
>mind-body relation is one-one
>in the body -> mind direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It
>is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett,

Bruno, I don't see where you think I disagree with you. I agree that a
particular simulated mind may have multiple physical implementations, and
that it is in general impossible for the mind to know which implementation
it is supported by. I make the further point that it is not necessary, in
general, for any conscious being at the level of the physical implementation
to be aware that the implementation is being run, in order for the simulated
being to be conscious.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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Received on Thu Jan 27 2005 - 17:50:16 PST

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