To have any sense perception there has to be the passage of an
inordinately large amount of time as compared to the smallest units of
time available. If each frame of time, the smallest divisible unit if
you assume that time is discreet, is a different identity, there would
be no perception. So you must expand the time frame out to at least a
"moment," which I'll define as the time for a passing thought. However,
all of this seems nonsense to me. Where is the cuttoff point that you
become a "different" person?
Danny Mayes
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 15/1/05 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Obviously! But it is so only because you dismiss the "failure
>> induction problem". Also: third person identity is arguably an
>> illusion. But I hardy doubt first person identity can ever be an
>> illusion or that it could even be useful to consider like it. What is
>> painful in pain for the suffering first person is mainly that the
>> pain can last, and this independently of any precise idea the first
>> person could have about who she is.
>
>
> This type of argument is often used to support the more "common sense"
> position on personal identity, but it is flawed. If I believe (as I
> do) that my future will consist of a series of people who live only
> for a moment, who believe they are me and share most of my memories,
> but aside from this similarity are no more "me" than any stranger is,
> then I shouldn't worry about "my" future suffering any more than I
> should worry about the suffering of a stranger. As a matter of fact, I
> would worry more if I expected to be tortured tomorrow than if I
> expected someone else would be tortured tomorrow. Therefore, the idea
> that continuity of personal identity is an illusion must be wrong, or
> at least my claim to believe this idea must be disingenuous.
>
> In fact, all this argument shows is that humans, and for that matter
> other animals, have evolved to behave as if the conventional view of
> personal identity is true. It is so primitive and deep-seated that
> "belief" is probably not the best word for it; it is more a feeling or
> instinct. And it is certainly not something I can overcome with mere
> reason!
>
> There wouln't be much point in arguing about all this if it were not
> for the theoretical possibility of teleportation, multiple universes,
> time travel and so on. Efforts to save the conventional view of
> personal identity in discussing these matters result in a complicated
> mess. If we allow that all that exists is individual moments of first
> person experience which can be grouped according to their similarity,
> as a stamp collector groups stamps, giving the impression of
> continuous streams of consciousness, all the apparent paradoxes and
> other difficulties disappear.
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Find love today with ninemsn personals. Click here:
> http://ninemsn.match.com?referrer=hotmailtagline
>
>
>
Received on Sat Jan 15 2005 - 11:30:30 PST