Bruno Marchal wrote:
>At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.
>
>
>With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term "world", this
>assumption would entail the falsity of comp,
>which is that I can be simulated by a computer program.
>(I, or any of the class of observers I belong(s) to).
Huh? I thought I was saying the opposite. I certainly believe in comp.
>In the spirit of your thought experiment, let me ask
>you a "personal" question. Assume you have big motivation
>for going to Mars. You can now choose between a 100$ and a
>10000$ teletransporter machine (TTM). Let us assume you are not so rich
>that this difference count (or adjust the number relatively to your
>situation).
>The 100$ TTM has no security and it is known that billion of copies of
>yourself
>will be sold elsewhere, for example to the kind of "hell" you were pointing
>to.
>The 10000$ TTM has quantum coded protection, so that the probability
>is very near one that no pirate will be able to copy you.
>Are you telling us that you will take the insecure low cost TTM ?
It's a good question, and this is where the rational comes up against the
emotional. If it were my first trip, I think I'd be very nervous about the
cheap alternative, and I would pay the extra or avoid going if I couldn't
afford it. However, if I had used the $100 service many times in the past
(through choice or necessity), I don't think I would worry about using it
again.
Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am
absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of
illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately
replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories, beliefs about being me,
etc., I would have no way of knowing that this was happening, and indeed I
believe that in a sense this IS happening, every moment of my life. Now,
suppose I am offered the following deal. In exchange for $1 million
deposited in my bank account, tonight I will be killed with a sharp axe in
my sleep, and in the morning a stranger will wake up in my bed who has been
brainwashed and implanted with all my memories at my last conscious moment.
This stranger will also have had plastic surgery so that he looks like me,
and he will then live life as me, among other things spending the $1 million
which is now in my bank account.
If I were rational, I should probably accept the above deal, on the grounds
that my apparent continuity of personal identity will be the same as it
always has been. If such a proposal were put to me, however, I would be
horrified; and I am sure my friends and family would be too, even if they
shared my philosophical beliefs about personal identity. I would also be
horrified if offered the role of the stranger who takes someone else's
place. I can't decide which would be worse.
On the other hand, if I had been forced to go through the above
transformation several times, I might get used to the idea and not be so
worried. Rationally, it shouldn't make any difference.
--Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Jan 13 2005 - 19:15:12 PST