Re: Belief Statements

From: Alastair Malcolm <amalcolm.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 09:45:06 -0000

----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
To: Alastair Malcolm <amalcolm.domain.name.hidden>;
<everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: 11 January 2005 14:47
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
> I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so
> there are many notion or "logical possibility".

It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me,
basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true
that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false'); any ambiguities
between logics in directly describing a (physical-type) world would tend to
be due to their particular application areas (for example temporal logic
would not be geared to worlds with certain alternatives to time); others
tend not to have this use at all (for example modal logic is more about
consistency/proveability/necessity, or worlds in general). Again, in the
same vein as my reply to Hal F, if a logic / formal system cannot
describe an entity, it is either due to an inherent restriction (compared to
other logics / formal systems), or else the entity is totally beyond our
comprehension (in a formal sense).

> The choice of the logic (or logicS) will depend on some basic assumptions.
.
.
.
>If you read the papers I am referring too, don't hesitate to ask questions.

Is it still the case that the best english version of the relevant ideas are
from your earlier posts to this list, as identified in your URL? I shall try
to look at them at some stage.

Alastair
Received on Wed Jan 12 2005 - 04:54:49 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:10 PST