Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

From: Hal Ruhl <>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2004 19:59:36 -0500

Hi Jesse:

I think some confusion took place surrounding the posts on or about 12/10.

In my initial post I said:


"9) Notice that the All also has a logical problem. Looking at the same
meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers
because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal information
which is not an aspect of the complete conceptual ensemble content of the
All. Thus the All is internally inconsistent.

10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must be consistent
with this inconsistency - That is the motion is at least partly random"


This has still not been commented on in the thread. Things got more
confused when the "internal" was somehow lost and we got on to a discussion
of specific possible internal components of the All and their
consistency. As I said in an earlier post the All has no net information
so any idea that it is itself - as an entity - is inconsistent has no
basis. It can not be consistent in the true/false way either. I do not
think that anyone has demonstrated that the All can not have internal
components that are true/false inconsistent. Thus my point in the initial


"10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary [an evolving Something] in
the All must be consistent with this inconsistency - That is the motion is
at least partly random."


Today I would amend # 10 because "random" is not correct in my opinion
because it has to pay attention to history to know it is indeed random. So
the most recent motion must rather be inconsistent with its past or future
- no accumulating info.


At 10:04 PM 12/20/2004, you wrote:
>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>>I do not think the conversation re:
>>>>>>"I can't think of any historical examples of new
>>>>>>mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to
>>>>>>already believe their premises in order to justify these premises",
>>has a valid place in this thread. Can you tell me why you do?
>Because you have said that your theory has this feature, and I was trying
>to understand if I might be misunderstanding you by asking you for other
>examples of theories that you think had this feature--I thought perhaps we
>might be understanding the idea of "having to believe the premises in
>order to justify the premises" differently, so that you might not actually
>be asking people to accept the tenets of your theory on blind faith. But
>if there is no misunderstanding, and you are indeed saying there is
>absolutely no justification for believing your theory in terms of any
>preexisting concepts we might have, then I suppose there is no further
>need to discuss this question.
>I still have the feeling that this is not quite the case though, since you
>are asking for comments/critiques of your theory, but what possible basis
>could comments/critiques have unless you believed we all had some shared
>standards for judging the merits of the theory? I think if you are able to
>figure out what standards you are using to judge the various elements of
>the theory, and what standards you expect others to judge it by in order
>to have useful comments about it, then if you can articulate these
>standards you may be able to give a clearer explanation of why you think
>it makes sense to accept your theory. For example, one of these standards
>may be the "a theory of everything should have no arbitrary elements"
>idea, which I think is shared by a lot of people on this list (I described
>this as the 'arbitrariness problem' in my post at
> ), and which you call the
>"no information" rule.
Received on Wed Dec 22 2004 - 20:03:07 PST

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