Re: Who believe in Concepts ? (Was: An All/Nothing multiverse model)

From: Georges Quenot <Georges.Quenot.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2004 09:59:43 +0100

Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
>
>> Hal Ruhl wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I would appreciate comments on the following.
>>> I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
>>> Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics
>>> are the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.
>>> Justification:
>>> 1) Given definitions 1, 2, and 3: [see original post]
>>
>>
>> I have already a problem here. It might not be specific to this proposal
>> but this is a good opportunity to raise the question.
>>
>> Defintion 1 and everything that follows depends in a strong way of the
>> concept of concept and on strong properties of that concept (like the
>> possibilty to discrimate what is a concept from what is not and to gather
>> all concepts in a set/ensemble/collection with a consistent meaning).
>
>
> Perhaps I could find a more neutral word or define what I mean by
> "concept".
>
> Please note however that the complete ensemble can not be consistent -
> after all it contains a completed arithmetic. Generally smaller sets
> can not prove their own consistency.
>
> snip

It des not sound consistent to me for various reasons. Is seems not to
be consistent for you either. Yet you mean to draw something from it ?

>> Let's assume nothingness exists. Therefore something (nothingness)
>> exists.
>
> That is one of my points if one replaces your "nothingness" with my
> "nothing" and your "something" with my "All".

Indeed I inserted that because I perceived a similarity between this and
what you said. But this was rather an illustration for the question of
whether words used in this utterance actually "get at something" and
whether their combination can make sense. Put in such an extreme form,
it appears to me as a mere game of word or a sophism and I wonder if
anyone can get convinced by such "reasonning".

> Any definition defines two entities simultaneously. Generally but not
> necessarily the smaller of the two entities is the one about which the
> definition says: "This entity is:....." The definition creates a
> boundary between this entity and a second entity which is all that the
> first is not. Most of the second entities may have no apparent
> usefulness but usefulness of an entity is not relevant.
>
>> Therefore nothingness doesn't exist.

Do you mean to cite the first instance or the second instance here ?
"Therefore nothingness doesn't exist (because something exists)" or
"Therefore nothingness doesn't exist (because assuming it exists
leads to the assertion of both a proposition and its negation)" ?

> Not at all. One can not define a "something" without simultaneously
> defining a "nothing" and vice versa.

This is not obvious to me. Defining a property that would always be
true does not imply that it have to or even it just could be false
sometimes. But this is not the point.

My first "therefore" (and therefore the second one) holds even though
because this is the minimum property that one would expect of any solid
sense of "nothingness". In case you insist to define simultaneously
a "something" and a "nothing", you would just have demonstrated the
inconsistency of any sound ("nothing","something") theory. I think
that (at least) Heidegger seriously claimed that.

> That is the usually unnoticed aspect of the definitional process.
> This leads you to the exclusionary statement below.
>
>> That's why there's something rather than noting.
>
>
> To the contrary both exist if either does.

You insist to claim that. Yet they are also exclusive since by its
very nature, nothingness excludes the existence of any something.

Georges.

I disappear when I am named. Who am I ?
Received on Mon Nov 15 2004 - 04:09:47 PST