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From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sun, 04 Jul 2004 17:08:41 +0200

At 14:20 03/07/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:

*>Yes, but some confusions are so easy to avoid! Confusions will always
*

*>appear in the middle of conversations, but I want them at least to be
*

*>unexpected ones...! Anyway, I didn't mean to derail the conversation with
*

*>my "jargoning"; I was just pointing out that whenever I see "platonism" in
*

*>one of these conversations, I'm never sure what we're really talking about.
*

No problem. Let us use "arithmetical realism", (for the belief that any

(close) arithmetical

formula is either true or false, independently of us). I mean first order

logic formula ... for those who know what I mean (cf Podnieks page if some

wants to know that urgently).

Now I recall the problem: by UDA physics (in world/state /situation A) is

given by a measure on all "computationnal histories" going through A and as

"seen" from A.

The strategy I have followed consist to ask a sound universal machine what

she thinks about that question. I translate the "world/state/situation A"

by a (finite or infinite) set of provable (DU accessible) arithmetical

propositions, and I translate "all computationnal histories" by the set of

all maximal consistent extensions of A. Then I show that the "measure one"

or "probability one" propositions p must satisfy the following conditions:

1) to be true everywhere (= true in all maximal consistent extensions, = []p)

2) to be true somewhere (= true in some consistent extensions, = <>p)

(by Godel "1)" does not imply "2)" from the machine in A perspective!)

This is enough to prove that the "probability 1" is quantum like. The

miracle comes from the

strange and counter-intuitive behavior of the Godel beweisbar (provability)

[] predicate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Sun Jul 04 2004 - 11:05:09 PDT

Date: Sun, 04 Jul 2004 17:08:41 +0200

At 14:20 03/07/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:

No problem. Let us use "arithmetical realism", (for the belief that any

(close) arithmetical

formula is either true or false, independently of us). I mean first order

logic formula ... for those who know what I mean (cf Podnieks page if some

wants to know that urgently).

Now I recall the problem: by UDA physics (in world/state /situation A) is

given by a measure on all "computationnal histories" going through A and as

"seen" from A.

The strategy I have followed consist to ask a sound universal machine what

she thinks about that question. I translate the "world/state/situation A"

by a (finite or infinite) set of provable (DU accessible) arithmetical

propositions, and I translate "all computationnal histories" by the set of

all maximal consistent extensions of A. Then I show that the "measure one"

or "probability one" propositions p must satisfy the following conditions:

1) to be true everywhere (= true in all maximal consistent extensions, = []p)

2) to be true somewhere (= true in some consistent extensions, = <>p)

(by Godel "1)" does not imply "2)" from the machine in A perspective!)

This is enough to prove that the "probability 1" is quantum like. The

miracle comes from the

strange and counter-intuitive behavior of the Godel beweisbar (provability)

[] predicate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Sun Jul 04 2004 - 11:05:09 PDT

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