Re: Questions about MWI and mathematical formalism

From: Hal Ruhl <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 03 May 2004 14:59:01 -0400

This is a slight expansion on my previous post under the "simulation" thread.

1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
definition of a "Nothing". Any definition process simultaneously defines
two entities. The definition is a boundary between an entity of interest
and the leftover building blocks. In the special case of a "Nothing" the
left over is an "Everything". Thus the two are dependent partners. Since
the "Everything" contains all information the definition pair must itself
specify all information and can be represented by a normal real.

2) A "Nothing" has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
meaningful question about itself. Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
question a "Nothing" would be incomplete. An inescapable meaningful
question is its own stability. This is not only meaningful it is
impossible to avoid answering.

3) To attempt to answer this question a "Nothing" randomly and
spontaneously "decays" towards an "Everything" to resolve its
incompleteness. But this is not sustainable since an "Everything" is not
independent of a "Nothing". Therefore a "Nothing" rebounds from the decay.

4) Thus the definition or boundary between the "Nothing" and "Everything"
pair is randomly dynamic equivalent to a random sequence of normal reals.

5) A universal computer is a good way to model a selector of a random
sequence of normal reals.

6) Notice that the "Everything" also has a logical problem. Looking at the
same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible
answers. Just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal
information which is not an aspect of the "Everything". Thus the
"Everything" is inconsistent.

7) Thus the entire system while being - apparently - the only game in town
is also both incomplete and inconsistent.

Hal
Received on Mon May 03 2004 - 15:05:21 PDT

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