Dear Bruno,
I would like to focus on one thing, but will interleave comments on the
rest..
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 10:05 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> Dear Stephen,
>
> At 13:44 29/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>
>
> > But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not
my
> >point.
>
>
> It is good it is not your point because there are delay in Platonia,
> at least in the sense I was using the word. A delay relative to a
> computational state is the minimal number of step for the UD
> to come back on that state or its continuations (roughly speaking).
> By the "compiler theorem" this make sense, and it is just a (computable)
> number. It has nothing to to with the subjective time we will
> be able to "axiomatize" once we define the first person, and it has
> nothing to do with the physical time which we will or will not
> recover from the quantum logics (given by interviewing
> the sound universal machine).
[SPK]
Now this statement has me very puzzled! Platonia must include all
possible computational steps and even if we only consider computations as N
to N maps we will find that there exist minimal recursions (like Poincare
recursions where the computation returns to its initial state) that will be
infinitely long. These are the type of computations that I am troubled by,
computations that are attempts to solve NP-Complete problems.
What kind of a delay is it when we have infinitely many steps? You seem
to have ignored what I wrote below.
I am distinguishing subjective time from this "delay"! But I wonder if
you are not forgetting that Platonia is, by definition, timeless. Platonia
is given, to abuse words, all at once. It is eternal and without beginning
or end to its existence. Given this, it must be Complete and all inclusive.
Do you not agree?
> > [SPK]
> >**I am trying to see how you deal with the problem of intractible
> >computations - as implementable given infinite resources - and how it may
be
> >possible for measures to be defined using them. I had not considered this
> >application but it is intriguing. ***
snip
> >
> >[SPK]
> >
> > Yes, but is this derivation on that can be taken to exist
independent of
> >the first person aspect of comp histories?
> >
> > This may be one of my key difficulties. On one hand, I do not have a
> >problem with the idea of Platonic existence, re AR, of mathematical
objects
> >but I do have a problem with the seeming lack of a clear explanation of
how
> >the "flow of temporality " arises in the first person aspect.
>
> [BM]
> But we have not yet arrive at this point. Wait for S4Grz. You *will*
> be delighted :) (We will see ...).
[SPK]
I am very interested in studying S4Grz!
> > [SPK]
> > It seems to me that what ever our theory of Everything is, it must
> >explain how it is not just possible to have a "flow of temporality" a
> >priori; it must have a non-measure zero sampling in the class of all
> >possible relationships between numbers - or whatever notion of Ur-object
> >that one uses.
> >
> > I personaly eschew the notion of fundamental "objects" and use the
> >Heraclitian notion of Process and fundamental, thus I see mathematical
> >objects - numbers, etc. - as derivative of this notion of Process. I see
> >Hintikka's idea of proofs as game theoretical constructs as strongly
hinting
> >at this idea...
>
> [BM]
> It is really a matter of convenience, to take numbers, sets, or games.
> But in general game theories, or set theories are richer and less simple
than
> elementary arithmetic. I don't think those dictinction are quite relevant.
> You will tell me ... after I make enough precise the result I got and the
> propositions I conjecture.
> Do you know Conway game theory? Where games are just a slight
> generalisation of his concept of number?
[SPK]
Yes, but it has been some time ago that I studied Conway's idea. I do
recall that it intrigued me a great deal. What is your take on it?
snip
> >[SPK]
> >
> > I have been following your discussion with Kory (and all others)
> >closely.
> >
> > In an attempt to "put all my cards on the table" I will state that
my
> >idea is a kind of process based mind-body dualism (based on Vaughan
Pratt's
> >work http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pratt95rational.html), but one that
becomes
> >very similar to Russell's "neutral monism" in the limit of "the Totality
of
> >Existence", which I believe is the same as your Platonia, e.g. an
> >"asymptotically vanishing dualism. I do not see Platonia as being
"mental"
> >or "mind", ala a new form of Berkeliean Idealism.
>
> [BM]
> We can guess similarities indeed. But (I told you this before) Pratt's
> paper are hard, and the relation with mind and bodies is implicit, nowhere
> does him really tackle the m/b problem.
Pratt explains his idea in great detail in the above referenced paper
and in several other places on his website. But it seems that his idea is
very hard to comprehend. It boils down to solving the problem of how minds
interact with minds and bodies with bodies, this after he proposes a way to
mathematically represent both. Perhaps you missed that part of his work...
;-)
IMHO, there are some important details left unfinished in Pratt's work,
mainly the "forgetful" mapping but I am confident that that will be solved
in the proper season.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
Received on Fri Apr 30 2004 - 19:56:07 PDT