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From: Kory Heath <kory.heath.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2004 08:23:20 -0400

Hi Bruno,

At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:

*>The important point is that once we keep up comp
*

*>through the eight points, we see that the laws of
*

*>physics, whatever they are, must be given
*

*>by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds.
*

I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something:

the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that "comp is true". The conclusion

is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will

ultimately match the "laws of physics" that we have discovered empirically.

One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about whether or not

the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of physics - that is,

agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true. Correct?

The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant

actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant

actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain

agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of provability,

nor do I know enough about quantum physics. From your perspective, are your

results strong enough to make you suspect that comp is true?

*>That would make
*

*>a great part of quantum physics into physical
*

*>laws in the sense of comp.
*

*>It would be a pleasure to explain this with
*

*>more details. Are you willing to hear a little
*

*>bit about Godel's theorem and some of its
*

*>generalisation by Lob and Solovay?
*

I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's Theorem

and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics - but I doubt

I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it might be a

waste of your time. Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of

your results. For instance, does your position entail that the "weirdness"

of quantum physics is deeply connected to the "weirdness" of provability

theory?

-- Kory

Received on Tue Apr 27 2004 - 08:29:15 PDT

Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2004 08:23:20 -0400

Hi Bruno,

At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something:

the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that "comp is true". The conclusion

is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will

ultimately match the "laws of physics" that we have discovered empirically.

One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about whether or not

the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of physics - that is,

agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true. Correct?

The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant

actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant

actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain

agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of provability,

nor do I know enough about quantum physics. From your perspective, are your

results strong enough to make you suspect that comp is true?

I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's Theorem

and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics - but I doubt

I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it might be a

waste of your time. Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of

your results. For instance, does your position entail that the "weirdness"

of quantum physics is deeply connected to the "weirdness" of provability

theory?

-- Kory

Received on Tue Apr 27 2004 - 08:29:15 PDT

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