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From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2004 17:15:26 +0200

This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on

this list a few

years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists

a measure over

the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.

Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''

states. Once you

consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a

probability distribution

over the set of all possible states you can be in (because

you can't define

time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional

probability for your

next experience given what you have experienced now. A

valid question is:

What is the probability that you will be in a state P that

contains the

memory that you have been in a state P'.

Quoting Stathis Papaioannou

<stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>:

*>
*

*> On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:
*

*>
*

*> QUOTE-
*

*> Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds
*

must exist if the

*> Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't
*

currently know how

*> likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of
*

possible-next-states

*> from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even
*

say that X is a

*> very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of
*

these states show me

*>
*

*> sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning
*

into a kangaroo,

*> etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been
*

bizarre and

*> inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the
*

Platonia theory.

*>
*

*> In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or
*

computationally (for

*>
*

*> me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast
*

majority of my

*> next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my
*

chair typing, with

*> very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be
*

an extremely

*> strong
*

*> reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct,
*

because it's

*> survived
*

*> a rather stringent falsification test.
*

*> -ENDQUOTE
*

*>
*

*> This analysis is sound only in the common sense single
*

world situation. You

*>
*

*> get into trouble if you try to use conventional
*

probabilities if multiple

*> histories/worlds/copies are allowed, as I tried to show
*

with the

*> teleportation example.
*

*>
*

*> Suppose that the overwhelming majority of your next-
*

possible-states are

*> totally bizarre, according to the theory we are testing.
*

If only one copy

*> of
*

*> you can exist at any one time, then the theory predicts
*

that there is a

*> billion to one probability that in the next second you
*

will find yourself

*> in
*

*> a bizarre universe. As a matter of fact, as you read
*

these words, you do

*> not
*

*> find that the world around you suddenly becomes bizarre.
*

Therefore, the

*> theory is most likely wrong.
*

*>
*

*> Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you
*

are allowed. The

*>
*

*> theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings
*

of the world in

*> the next second, with each branch containing a person who
*

shares all your

*> memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as
*

above, that all but

*>
*

*> one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a
*

matter of fact, as you

*>
*

*> read these words, you do not experience the world around
*

you suddenly

*> becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this
*

is entirely

*> consistent with the theory, which predicted that one
*

version of you would

*> continue in the world as per usual.
*

*>
*

*> --Stathis Papaioannou
*

*>
*

*>
*

____________________________________________________________

_____

*> Get Extra Storage in 10MB, 25MB, 50MB and 100MB options
*

now! Go to

*> http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-au&page=hotmail/es2
*

*>
*

Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2004 17:15:26 +0200

This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on

this list a few

years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists

a measure over

the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.

Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''

states. Once you

consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a

probability distribution

over the set of all possible states you can be in (because

you can't define

time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional

probability for your

next experience given what you have experienced now. A

valid question is:

What is the probability that you will be in a state P that

contains the

memory that you have been in a state P'.

Quoting Stathis Papaioannou

<stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>:

must exist if the

currently know how

possible-next-states

say that X is a

these states show me

into a kangaroo,

bizarre and

Platonia theory.

computationally (for

majority of my

chair typing, with

an extremely

because it's

world situation. You

probabilities if multiple

with the

possible-states are

If only one copy

that there is a

will find yourself

these words, you do

Therefore, the

are allowed. The

of the world in

shares all your

above, that all but

matter of fact, as you

you suddenly

is entirely

version of you would

____________________________________________________________

_____

now! Go to

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