- Contemporary messages sorted: [ by date ] [ by thread ] [ by subject ] [ by author ] [ by messages with attachments ]

From: Kory Heath <kory.heath.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2004 00:04:11 -0400

Bruno -

Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the

intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, if we analyze the

structure of all possible 1st-person histories of all possible

self-aware-subsystems in Platonia, we would find that histories that

exhibit the basic elements of what we commonly think of as our "laws of

physics" - say, light, gravity, etc. - have a greater measure than those

histories that contain (say) "srats and gilixas", and that therefore our

"local laws" are the most common ones in Platonia. I find this position

highly dubious, but I no longer think that's what you were saying.

My new interpretation of what you're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong

again) is that if you were to examine the entire ensemble of

"next-possible-states" of *me* (Kory Heath) at this moment, you would find

that (as a mathematical fact, part of the basic structure of Platonia) most

of them contain galaxies and stars, etc. Therefore, the regularities I see

around me are simply the emergent effect of my "first person indeterminacy

domain". If we imagine some other computational state that represents a SAS

with a personality, memories of growing up in a world that contains "srats

and gilixas", etc., most of that SAS's next-possible-states would contain

srats and gilixas, so a very different set of stable "local laws" would

emerge from that SAS's "first person indeterminacy domain". (We can imagine

that the resulting regularities resemble a 4+1D cellular automata, which

contains nothing like our gravity, light, etc.).

I'm still confused by some parts of your post. I don't see why the

assumption that most of my "next-possible-states" do in fact contain stars

and galaxies necessarily follows from points 1-7. Here's a very rough

sketch of what I think points 1-7 *do* imply:

Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a

self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of

next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The chances of one

self-aware state "jumping" (I know my terminology is dangerously loose

here) to any particular next state is 1 / X, where X is the total number of

next-possible-states for the state in question. Any regularities which

emerge out of this indeterminate traversal from state to state will be

perceived as local "laws of physics".

Now, you say: "Let us (re)define the laws of physics as the laws we can

always predict and verify consistently (if any!). Now, having accepted the

1-7 points, the occurrence of such laws must have a measure 1, so the laws

of physics must be derivable from what has measure 1 relatively to the

measure on the computational histories." I agree with this, but to me it

seems like a simple tautology - another statement of my above paragraph. It

sounds to me like you're saying that the (local) laws of physics are

whatever regularities emerge when we examine the entire ensemble of

next-possible-states from my current state (and the ensemble of all the

next-possible-states from each of those possible-states, and so on). This

is tautologically true - "whatever emerges, emerges". The real question is,

what reason do we have to believe that any regularities actually emerge? In

other words, how do we *know* that most of my "next-possible-states" do in

fact contain stars and galaxies? This idea doesn't necessarily follow from

anything in points 1-7.

Perhaps you're arguing the following: we do in fact perceive a world filled

with regularities, which we have codified into our local "laws of physics".

Therefore, *if* points 1-7 are true - that is, if "comp" is true - then it

must be the case that most of my "next-possible-states" do in fact contain

stars and galaxies and gravity and light. If I were (somehow) able to

completely mathematically analyze one of my computational states and all of

its next-possible-states, and if I then determined that the probabilities

in this ensemble of next-possible-states *didn't* match the regularities I

actually perceive, then I should conclude that comp is false. If this is

your argument, then it might be helpful to add another point - lets call it

Point 7.5 - which states that "we do in fact perceive regularities that we

codify into (local) laws of physics". Then your argument can run: if points

1-7.5 are all true, then it must be true that most of my

next-possible-states contain stars and galaxies.

This argument implies a constraint on comp - which is good, because it

means that comp is falsifiable - but it doesn't give me any clue how to

show mathematically that most of Kory Heath's next-possible-states actually

do contain stars and galaxies - i.e. that most of Kory Heath's

next-possible-states match the laws of physics, or at least exhibit some

kind of probabilistic bias that would result in perceived regularities. I

suppose that this is what you mean when you say that we need to ""modelize"

or better "identify" a platonistic observer by a sound modest

(lobian) universal church-turing-post-markov-fortran-lisp-java-whatever

machine (including quantum one)", and to "interview it about those relative

consistent extensions and its inferable platonistic geometries and what is

stable in their discourses." I have to confess that I don't have a very

clear picture of what results you've derived from all of that.

I'm also somewhat confused by the following statement:

*>But "platonistically" it remains that if comp is true
*

*>the actual physical invariant must emerge as an average
*

*>on ALL the maximal consistent extensions relative to our
*

*>actual states (worlds, observer-moments, whatever ...).
*

*>Although that can be proved useless for actually predicting the
*

*>behavior of the chalk, it is enough for deriving physics.
*

If this is enough for "deriving physics", why isn't it enough to predict

the behavior of falling chalk, since gravity is one of the most basic

elements of our physics? Or are you referring to something different than

the "local geographical laws" that we call physics?

-- Kory

Received on Sat Apr 24 2004 - 00:09:40 PDT

Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2004 00:04:11 -0400

Bruno -

Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the

intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, if we analyze the

structure of all possible 1st-person histories of all possible

self-aware-subsystems in Platonia, we would find that histories that

exhibit the basic elements of what we commonly think of as our "laws of

physics" - say, light, gravity, etc. - have a greater measure than those

histories that contain (say) "srats and gilixas", and that therefore our

"local laws" are the most common ones in Platonia. I find this position

highly dubious, but I no longer think that's what you were saying.

My new interpretation of what you're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong

again) is that if you were to examine the entire ensemble of

"next-possible-states" of *me* (Kory Heath) at this moment, you would find

that (as a mathematical fact, part of the basic structure of Platonia) most

of them contain galaxies and stars, etc. Therefore, the regularities I see

around me are simply the emergent effect of my "first person indeterminacy

domain". If we imagine some other computational state that represents a SAS

with a personality, memories of growing up in a world that contains "srats

and gilixas", etc., most of that SAS's next-possible-states would contain

srats and gilixas, so a very different set of stable "local laws" would

emerge from that SAS's "first person indeterminacy domain". (We can imagine

that the resulting regularities resemble a 4+1D cellular automata, which

contains nothing like our gravity, light, etc.).

I'm still confused by some parts of your post. I don't see why the

assumption that most of my "next-possible-states" do in fact contain stars

and galaxies necessarily follows from points 1-7. Here's a very rough

sketch of what I think points 1-7 *do* imply:

Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a

self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of

next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The chances of one

self-aware state "jumping" (I know my terminology is dangerously loose

here) to any particular next state is 1 / X, where X is the total number of

next-possible-states for the state in question. Any regularities which

emerge out of this indeterminate traversal from state to state will be

perceived as local "laws of physics".

Now, you say: "Let us (re)define the laws of physics as the laws we can

always predict and verify consistently (if any!). Now, having accepted the

1-7 points, the occurrence of such laws must have a measure 1, so the laws

of physics must be derivable from what has measure 1 relatively to the

measure on the computational histories." I agree with this, but to me it

seems like a simple tautology - another statement of my above paragraph. It

sounds to me like you're saying that the (local) laws of physics are

whatever regularities emerge when we examine the entire ensemble of

next-possible-states from my current state (and the ensemble of all the

next-possible-states from each of those possible-states, and so on). This

is tautologically true - "whatever emerges, emerges". The real question is,

what reason do we have to believe that any regularities actually emerge? In

other words, how do we *know* that most of my "next-possible-states" do in

fact contain stars and galaxies? This idea doesn't necessarily follow from

anything in points 1-7.

Perhaps you're arguing the following: we do in fact perceive a world filled

with regularities, which we have codified into our local "laws of physics".

Therefore, *if* points 1-7 are true - that is, if "comp" is true - then it

must be the case that most of my "next-possible-states" do in fact contain

stars and galaxies and gravity and light. If I were (somehow) able to

completely mathematically analyze one of my computational states and all of

its next-possible-states, and if I then determined that the probabilities

in this ensemble of next-possible-states *didn't* match the regularities I

actually perceive, then I should conclude that comp is false. If this is

your argument, then it might be helpful to add another point - lets call it

Point 7.5 - which states that "we do in fact perceive regularities that we

codify into (local) laws of physics". Then your argument can run: if points

1-7.5 are all true, then it must be true that most of my

next-possible-states contain stars and galaxies.

This argument implies a constraint on comp - which is good, because it

means that comp is falsifiable - but it doesn't give me any clue how to

show mathematically that most of Kory Heath's next-possible-states actually

do contain stars and galaxies - i.e. that most of Kory Heath's

next-possible-states match the laws of physics, or at least exhibit some

kind of probabilistic bias that would result in perceived regularities. I

suppose that this is what you mean when you say that we need to ""modelize"

or better "identify" a platonistic observer by a sound modest

(lobian) universal church-turing-post-markov-fortran-lisp-java-whatever

machine (including quantum one)", and to "interview it about those relative

consistent extensions and its inferable platonistic geometries and what is

stable in their discourses." I have to confess that I don't have a very

clear picture of what results you've derived from all of that.

I'm also somewhat confused by the following statement:

If this is enough for "deriving physics", why isn't it enough to predict

the behavior of falling chalk, since gravity is one of the most basic

elements of our physics? Or are you referring to something different than

the "local geographical laws" that we call physics?

-- Kory

Received on Sat Apr 24 2004 - 00:09:40 PDT

*
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0
: Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:09 PST
*