- Contemporary messages sorted: [ by date ] [ by thread ] [ by subject ] [ by author ] [ by messages with attachments ]

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:13:46 +0200

At 09:58 13/04/04 -0400, Ben Goertzel wrote:

*> > 6) This shows that if we are in a massive computer running in
*

*> > a universe, then (supposing we know it or believe it) to
*

*> > predict the future of any experiment we decide to carry one
*

*> > (for example testing A or B) we need to take into account all
*

*> > reconstitutions at any time of the computer (in the relevant
*

*> > state) in that universe, and actually also in any other
*

*> > universes (from our first person perspective we could not be
*

*> > aware of the difference of universes from inside the computer).
*

*>
*

*>Yes, but this is just a fancy version of the good old-fashioned Humean
*

*>problem of induction, isn't it?
*

That would be the case if there were no measure on the computations.

*>Indeed, predicting the future on a sound "a priori" basis is not
*

*>possible. One must make arbitrary assumptions in order to guide
*

*>predictions.
*

*>
*

*>This is a limitation, not of the "comp" hypothesis specifically, but of
*

*>the notion of prediction itself.
*

*>
*

*>You cannot solve the problem of induction with or without "comp", so I
*

*>don't think you should use problem-of-induction related difficulties as
*

*>an argument against "comp."
*

I was not arguing against comp! (nor for).

*>In fact, "comp" comes with a kind of workaround to the problem of
*

*>induction, which is: To justify induction, make an arbitrary assumption
*

*>of a certain universal computer, use this to gauge simplicity, and then
*

*>judge predictions based on their simplicity (to use a verbal shorthand
*

*>for a lot of math a la Solomonoff, Levin, Hutter, etc.). This is not a
*

*>solution to the problem of induction (which is that one must make
*

*>arbitrary assumptions to do induction), just an elegant way of
*

*>introducing the arbitrary assumptions.
*

This can help for explaining what intelligence is, but cannot help

for the mind body problem where *all* computations must be taken into

account.

*>So, in my view, we are faced with a couple different ways of introducing
*

*>the arbitrary assumptions needed to justify induction:
*

*>
*

*>1) make an arbitrary assumption that the apparently real physical
*

*>universe is real
*

*>
*

*>2) make an arbitrary assumption that simpler hypotheses are better,
*

*>where simplicity is judged by some fixed universal computing system
*

*>
*

*>There is no scientific (i.e. inductive or deductive) way to choose
*

*>between these. From a human perspective, the choice lies outside the
*

*>domain of science and math; it's a metaphysical or even ethical choice.
*

I am not convinced. I don't really understand 1), and the interest of 2)

relies, I think, in the fact that simplicity should not (and does not, I'm sure

Schmidhuber would agree) on the choice of the universal computing

system.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Wed Apr 14 2004 - 11:14:39 PDT

Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:13:46 +0200

At 09:58 13/04/04 -0400, Ben Goertzel wrote:

That would be the case if there were no measure on the computations.

I was not arguing against comp! (nor for).

This can help for explaining what intelligence is, but cannot help

for the mind body problem where *all* computations must be taken into

account.

I am not convinced. I don't really understand 1), and the interest of 2)

relies, I think, in the fact that simplicity should not (and does not, I'm sure

Schmidhuber would agree) on the choice of the universal computing

system.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Wed Apr 14 2004 - 11:14:39 PDT

*
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0
: Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:09 PST
*