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From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 05 Mar 2004 15:08:10 +0100

At 19:22 04/03/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:

*>Dear Bruno,
*

*>
*

*> While I am VERY impressed by your reasoning, I must insist that it is
*

*>necessary to make this aspect of COMP falsifiable.
*

Which aspect? We were just talking about Godel's incompleteness theorem

(which btw concerns more general things than just consistent machine )

*>How is it decided
*

*>empirically that entity X can not prove that P?
*

I don't think it is an empirical question.

*>This reminds me of the
*

*>statement "all crows are not non-black". It seems to me that we are putting
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*>ourselves in the impossible position of having to prove a negative.
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*>
*

*> It is one thing to be able to point to mathematical proofs germane to
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*>mathematics proper but when we are trying to create models that are to be
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*>quantifiably predictive, we simply can not postulate such entities as
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*>"Platonia" and Arithmetic Realism as a basis.
*

I don't understand why. What I have shown is that the comp postulate

(Arithmetical Realism, Church thesis, +"Yes Doctor") entails that

physics is given by a measure on the comp histories.

The comp histories are pure mathematical object. Physical

space/time appears as internal relative modalities.

(Some others in the everything-list list seem to arrive toward similar

conclusions).

Then I use the Godel-Lob-Solovay-Boolos-Goldblatt-Visser theorems

in self-reference logic to isolate the logic of the "probability one"

(on the comp histories)

and it gives a system AQL (say) close to Quantum Logic.

The real question is : how close?

It is a matter of time to show if AQL is rich enough to justify, for

exemple, the possibility of quantum computing in the

neighborhood of all observers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Fri Mar 05 2004 - 09:11:13 PST

Date: Fri, 05 Mar 2004 15:08:10 +0100

At 19:22 04/03/04 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Which aspect? We were just talking about Godel's incompleteness theorem

(which btw concerns more general things than just consistent machine )

I don't think it is an empirical question.

I don't understand why. What I have shown is that the comp postulate

(Arithmetical Realism, Church thesis, +"Yes Doctor") entails that

physics is given by a measure on the comp histories.

The comp histories are pure mathematical object. Physical

space/time appears as internal relative modalities.

(Some others in the everything-list list seem to arrive toward similar

conclusions).

Then I use the Godel-Lob-Solovay-Boolos-Goldblatt-Visser theorems

in self-reference logic to isolate the logic of the "probability one"

(on the comp histories)

and it gives a system AQL (say) close to Quantum Logic.

The real question is : how close?

It is a matter of time to show if AQL is rich enough to justify, for

exemple, the possibility of quantum computing in the

neighborhood of all observers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Received on Fri Mar 05 2004 - 09:11:13 PST

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