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From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 04:58:05 -0500

By the way, after writing my message the other day about the question of

what it means for the RSSA and ASSA to be compatible or incompatible, I

thought of another condition that should be met if you want to have both an

absolute probability distribution on observer-moments and a conditional one

from any one observer-moment to another. Suppose I pick an observer-moment B

from the set of all observer-moments according to the following procedure:

1. First, randomly select an observer-moment A from the set of all

observer-moments, using the absolute probability distribution.

2. Then, select a "next" observer-moment B to follow A from the set of all

observer-moments, using the conditional probability distribution from A to

all others.

What will be the probability of getting a particular observer-moment for

your B if you use this procedure? I would say that in order for the RSSA and

ASSA to be compatible, it should always be the *same* probability as that of

getting that particular observer-moment if you just use the absolute

probability distribution alone. If this wasn't true, if the two probability

distributions differed, then I don't see how you could justify using one or

the other in the ASSA--after all, my "current" observer-moment is also just

the "next" moment from my previous observer-moment's point of view, and a

moment from now I will experience a different observer-moment which is the

successor of my current one. I shouldn't get different conclusions if I look

at a given observer-moment from different but equally valid perspectives, or

else there is something fundamentally wrong with the theory.

I think there'd be an analogy for this in statistical mechanics, in a case

where you have a probabilistic rule for deciding the path through phase

space...if the system is at equilibrium, then the probabilities of the

system being in different states should not change over time, so if I find

the probability the system will be in the state B at time t+1 by first

finding the probability of all possible states at time t and then

multiplying by the conditional probability of each one evolving to B at time

t+1, then summing all these products, I should get the same answer as if I

just looked at the probability I would find it in state B at time t. I'm not

sure what the general conditions are that need to be met in order for an

absolute probability distribution and a set of conditional probability

distributions to have this property though. In the case of absolute and

conditional probability distributions on observer-moments, hopefully this

property would just emerge naturally once you found the correct theory of

consciousness and wrote the equations for how the absolute and relative

distributions must relate to one another.

One final weird thought I had a while ago on this type of TOE. What if, in

finding the correct theory of consciousness, there turned out to a sort of

self-similarity between the way individual observer-moments work and the way

the probability distributions on the set of all observer-moments work? In

other words, perhaps the theory of consciousness would describe an

individual observer-moment in terms of some set of sub-components which are

each assigned a different absolute weight (perhaps corresponding to the

amount of 'attention' I am giving to different elements of my current

experience), along with weighted links between these elements (which could

correspond to the percieved relationships between these different elements,

like in a neural net). This kind of self-similarity might justify a sort of

pantheist interpretation of the theory, or an "absolute idealist" one maybe,

in which the multiverse as a whole could be seen as a kind of infinite

observer-moment, the only possible self-consistent one (assuming the

absolute and conditional probability distributions constrain each other in

such a way as to lead to a unique solution, as I suggested earlier). Of

course there's no reason to think a theory of consciousness will necessarily

describe observer-moments in this way, but it doesn't seem completely

implausible that it would, so it's interesting to think about.

Jesse

_________________________________________________________________

Let the new MSN Premium Internet Software make the most of your high-speed

experience. http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=byoa/prem&ST=1

Received on Wed Feb 04 2004 - 05:00:41 PST

Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 04:58:05 -0500

By the way, after writing my message the other day about the question of

what it means for the RSSA and ASSA to be compatible or incompatible, I

thought of another condition that should be met if you want to have both an

absolute probability distribution on observer-moments and a conditional one

from any one observer-moment to another. Suppose I pick an observer-moment B

from the set of all observer-moments according to the following procedure:

1. First, randomly select an observer-moment A from the set of all

observer-moments, using the absolute probability distribution.

2. Then, select a "next" observer-moment B to follow A from the set of all

observer-moments, using the conditional probability distribution from A to

all others.

What will be the probability of getting a particular observer-moment for

your B if you use this procedure? I would say that in order for the RSSA and

ASSA to be compatible, it should always be the *same* probability as that of

getting that particular observer-moment if you just use the absolute

probability distribution alone. If this wasn't true, if the two probability

distributions differed, then I don't see how you could justify using one or

the other in the ASSA--after all, my "current" observer-moment is also just

the "next" moment from my previous observer-moment's point of view, and a

moment from now I will experience a different observer-moment which is the

successor of my current one. I shouldn't get different conclusions if I look

at a given observer-moment from different but equally valid perspectives, or

else there is something fundamentally wrong with the theory.

I think there'd be an analogy for this in statistical mechanics, in a case

where you have a probabilistic rule for deciding the path through phase

space...if the system is at equilibrium, then the probabilities of the

system being in different states should not change over time, so if I find

the probability the system will be in the state B at time t+1 by first

finding the probability of all possible states at time t and then

multiplying by the conditional probability of each one evolving to B at time

t+1, then summing all these products, I should get the same answer as if I

just looked at the probability I would find it in state B at time t. I'm not

sure what the general conditions are that need to be met in order for an

absolute probability distribution and a set of conditional probability

distributions to have this property though. In the case of absolute and

conditional probability distributions on observer-moments, hopefully this

property would just emerge naturally once you found the correct theory of

consciousness and wrote the equations for how the absolute and relative

distributions must relate to one another.

One final weird thought I had a while ago on this type of TOE. What if, in

finding the correct theory of consciousness, there turned out to a sort of

self-similarity between the way individual observer-moments work and the way

the probability distributions on the set of all observer-moments work? In

other words, perhaps the theory of consciousness would describe an

individual observer-moment in terms of some set of sub-components which are

each assigned a different absolute weight (perhaps corresponding to the

amount of 'attention' I am giving to different elements of my current

experience), along with weighted links between these elements (which could

correspond to the percieved relationships between these different elements,

like in a neural net). This kind of self-similarity might justify a sort of

pantheist interpretation of the theory, or an "absolute idealist" one maybe,

in which the multiverse as a whole could be seen as a kind of infinite

observer-moment, the only possible self-consistent one (assuming the

absolute and conditional probability distributions constrain each other in

such a way as to lead to a unique solution, as I suggested earlier). Of

course there's no reason to think a theory of consciousness will necessarily

describe observer-moments in this way, but it doesn't seem completely

implausible that it would, so it's interesting to think about.

Jesse

_________________________________________________________________

Let the new MSN Premium Internet Software make the most of your high-speed

experience. http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=byoa/prem&ST=1

Received on Wed Feb 04 2004 - 05:00:41 PST

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