Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?

From: Eric Hawthorne <egh.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2004 12:21:40 -0800

Can you explain briefly why the choice of measure is subjective? I
haven't read any of the
books you mentioned (will try to get to them) but am familiar with
computability theory
and decision theory.

In my favourite interpretation of the multiverse, as a very long
(possibly lengthening)
qubitstring containing all of the possible information-states implied in
such a long bitstring,
the "absolute" measure of any information-state (instantaneous state of
some universe)
would be the same as any other state of the same bitstring length.

In that framing of things, I guess there's another definition of
measure, which goes something
like this:

 Let Ui be an "internal-time-ordered" set of information-states
s1,s2,...,s(now) comprising
an observable universe.

Ui, to be observable, is constrained to be an informationally
self-consistent
(too complex a concept to get into right here) set of information-states.

There is a constraint on any information-state which qualifies to be
s(now+1) in any observable
universe path s1,s2,...,S(now). Specifically, any information-state that
can be S(now+1)
must be informationally consistent (not law violating) in conjunction
with s1,s2,...,S(now).

Furthermore, the history that has evolved as s1,s2,...,s(now) has the
result of determining
the Ui-relative probability of any particular other information-state
being able to become
s(now+1) in that observable path.

That now-in-an-observable-universe-relative probability of successorhood
in that universe
of any other information-state is then a universe-specific measure
value, or more specifically,
a now-state-of-universe specific measure value.

That now-in-an-observable-universe measure (for potential successor
information states for that
universe state-set) may correspond to the probabilities of all the
outcomes of all the wave equations
of quantum-states which are observable in the "now" moment in that universe.

As a comp sci person and not a physicist, I look forward to your read on
where my interpretation
is misguided, and for a better interpretation.

Eric

Wei Dai wrote:

>I have to say that I sympathize with Caesar, but my position is slightly
>different. I think there is a possibility that that objective morality
>does exist, but we're simply too stupid to realize what it is. Therefore
>we should try to improve our intelligence, through intelligence
>amplication, or artificial intelligence, before saying that objective
>morality is impossible and therefore we should just pursue other goals
>like survival, comfort or happiness.
>
>Some people have argued that in fact survival is an objective goal,
>because evolution makes sure that people who don't pursue survival don't
>exist. But if we assume that everything exists, the above statement has to
>be modified to an assertion that people who don't pursue survival have low
>measure. However the choice of measure itself is subjective, so why
>shouldn't one use a measure in which people who don't pursue survival have
>high measure (e.g., one which favors universes where those people
>survive anyway through good luck or benevolent gods)?
>
>
>
>
Received on Sat Jan 24 2004 - 15:28:39 PST