Re: Are conscious beings always fallible?

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 11:43:43 +0100

I agree with you. Actually you can use the second recursion theorem
of Kleene to collapse all the orders. This is easier in an untyped
programming language like (pure) LISP than in a typed language,
although some typed language have a primitive for handling untyped
self-reference, like the primitive SELF in Smalltalk ...

Bruno



At 23:29 19/01/04 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote:
>How would they ever know that I wonder?
>"Well let's see. I'm conscious and I'm not fallible. Therefore...." ;-)
>
>David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
>
>>I'm wondering whether the following demonstrates that a computer that can
>>only generate "thoughts" which are sentences derivable from some underlying
>>axioms (and therefore can only generate "true" thoughts) is unable to think.
>>
>>This is based on the fact that a formal system can't understand sentences
>>written down within that formal system (forgive me if I've worded this
>>badly).
>>
>>Somehow we would need to support free parameters within quoted expressions.
>>Eg to specify the rule
>>
>> It is a good idea to simplify "x+0" to "x"
>>
>>It is not clear that language reflection can be supported in a completely
>>general way. If it can, does this eliminate the need for a meta-language?
>>How does this relate to the claim above?
>>
>>- David
>>
>I don't see the problem with representing logical meta-language, and
>meta-metalanguage... etc if necessary
>in a computer. It's a bit tricky to get the semantics to work out
>correctly, I think, but there's nothing
>"extra-computational" about doing higher-order theorem proving.
>
>http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/HOL/
>
>This is an example of an interactive (i.e. partly human-steered)
>higher-order thereom prover.
>I think with enough work someone could get one of these kind of systems
>doing some useful higher-order
>logic reasoning on its own, for certain kinds of problem domains anyway.
>
>Eric
Received on Tue Jan 20 2004 - 05:45:18 PST

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