Why is it assumed that a multiple "runs" makes any difference to the
measure?
If the computation is reversible we could run the simulation backwards -
even though the initial state make seem contrived because it leads to a
low entropy at the end of the computation. Given that the simulated
beings don't know the difference (their subjective time runs in the
direction of increasing entropy) the fact that the simulation is done in
reverse is irrelevant to them.
Would a simulation done in reverse contribute to the measure?
Once we say that all possible computations exist in the Platonic sense,
it seems to me that running them is irrelevant. Of course it is agreed
that the existence hypothesis tells us nothing about their relative
measure. Does anyone have some principles to go by?
I presume a theory of measure along the lines described by Jesse would
need to account for the measure of mappings between computations.
Presumably a simple correspondence would have higher weighting than some
complicated mapping between two computations.
- David
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:lasermazer.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Saturday, 17 January 2004 4:56 AM
> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: Is the universe computable
>
> Eugen Leitl:
> >I have trouble alternating between the internal and the external
observer
> >view. So we have a machine crunching bits, sequentially falling from
> state
> >to
> >state. This spans a continous trajectory. We can make a full record
of
> that
> >trajectory, eliminating a time axis. When does the subjective
observation
> >of
> >existence assemble into place? The first time the computation was
made?
> >
> >I have trouble seeing my subjective observer experience as a sequence
of
> >frames, already computed. Is the first run magical, and the static
record
> >dead meat? I'm confused.
>
> I think the most common theory on this list is that there is nothing
> special
> about the first vs. the second run--rather, the total number of runs
helps
> determine the measure of that subjective experience. If I scan my
brain
> into
> a computer knowing that my first experience after being uploaded will
> depend
> on what environment is created for my simulated brain, I should make
sure
> my
> friends do lots of runs where the upload wakes up in an idyllic
> environment
> and that my enemies don't get their hands on the program and do a lot
of
> runs where the upload is used as a slave or something. If my enemies
do
> manage to get a copy and do a few of those runs before they are caught
and
> stopped by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Uploads, my
> friends
> can at least try to minimize the damage by doing so many runs of the
> idyllic
> environment that the probability of having that experience after I
wake up
> will be much greater than the probability that my first experience
after
> being uploaded will be waking up as a slave to my enemies (according
to
> this
> particular theory of how measure works, anyway).
>
> Jesse Mazer
>
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Received on Mon Jan 19 2004 - 01:09:08 PST