RE: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Jesse said
> So, although the set of all well-defined finite descriptions must
clearly
> be
> "countable" in the traditional sense where arbitrary mappings are
allowed,
> it is not countable if only finite-describable mappings are allowed,
> although it can easily be shown to be smaller than another countable
set,
> namely the set of all finite descriptions without regard for whether
they
> are "well-defined" or not
Doesn't this unintuitive result show that you are doomed if you only
believe in the platonic existence of mathematical objects with finite
descriptions?
Was this the point you were making, despite saying earlier you were
skeptical of the existence of objects without a finite description?
- David
Received on Sun Nov 30 2003 - 20:52:06 PST
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