Hal Finney wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer writes:
> > OK, so now go back to the scenario where you're supposed to
> > be recreated in both Washington and Moscow, except assume that at the
>last
> > moment there's a power failure in Moscow and the recreator machine fails
>to
> > activate. Surely this is no different from the scenario where you were
>only
> > supposed to be recreated in Washington--the fact that they *intended* to
> > duplicate you in Moscow shouldn't make any difference, all that matters
>is
> > that they didn't....
> > Extending this to the idea of natural duplication due to
> > different branches of a splitting multiverse, the probability should
>always
> > be 100% that my next experience is one of a universe where I have not
>been
> > killed.
>
>I question this analogy. There is an important numerical distinction
>between duplication by matter recreation and by quantum splitting. The
>former increases your measure, while the latter does not.
>
>In the case of successful duplication, your measure doubles. If the
>duplication fails and you end up with only one copy, your measure stays
>the same. But if you flip a quantum coin and end up in two branches,
>your measure is constant. If you die in one of the branches, your
>measure is halved.
>
>Therefore I don't think you can take conclusions from the one case and
>apply them to the other. You wouldn't say that failing to double your
>money is the same as halving it.
>
>Measure is important. It is what guides our life every day.
>We constantly make decisions so as to maximize the measure of good
>outcomes, as nearly as we can judge. I don't think we can neglect it
>in these thought experiments.
What type of "measure" are you talking about? I had gotten the impression
reading this list that the measure on "everything", however it's
defined--all possible computations, for example--was an open question, and
that different TOEs might disagree. Are you talking about a type of measure
specific to the MWI of quantum mechanics? I thought there was supposed to be
a problem with this due to the "no preferred basis" problem.
In any case, if there is some sort of theory that would give objective
truths about first-person probabilities in splitting experiments (and I'm
not sure if you believe in continuity of consciousness or that such a theory
is out there waiting to be found), then if first-person probabilities
disagree with "measure", however it's defined, I think most people would
care more about maximizing the first-person probabilities of good outcomes
as opposed to measure. The main reason to care about measure would be for
altruistic reasons, that you don't want friends and families to have a high
probability of suffering because they see you die, but even this could be
stated in terms of maximizing the subjective probability of happy outcomes
for other people.
Jesse Mazer
_________________________________________________________________
Is your computer infected with a virus? Find out with a FREE computer virus
scan from McAfee. Take the FreeScan now!
http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963
Received on Fri Nov 07 2003 - 15:51:33 PST