I have always found the RSSA rather strange. From the discussion between
Mallah and Maloney:
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1362.html
> > one must first define "you". There are three reasonable
> > possibilities in the ASSA:
> > 1. One particular observer-moment. You have no past and no future.
> > 2. A set of observer moments linked by computation. With this
> > definition the problem is that "you" may be two (or more) people
> > at the same time! The advantage with this definition is that one
> > can predict effective probabilities of what "you" will see at other
> > times similar to what you want to do with the RSSA. Thing is, if
> > there is nonconservation of measure, the predictions start to differ
> > from the RSSA about things like how old you should expect to be.
> > Remember, testable prediction do NOT depend on definitions, so it is
> > often better to use def. #1 to prevent such confusion.
> > 3. A particular implementation of an extended computation. Similar to
> > 2; allows death, when that implementation ends. I prefer this or
#1.
#1 seems the most reasonable option to me. You do away with the reference
class problem. Also it is fully consistent with ''normal'' physics.
Saibal
----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
Van: "Russell Standish" <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
Aan: "Saibal Mitra" <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
CC: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Verzonden: Sunday, November 02, 2003 05:45 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Quantum accident survivor
> I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is
> invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big
> debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to
> experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you
> would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much*
> weirder.
>
> Cheers
>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
> > There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't
expect
> > to survive such accidents.
> >
> > Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of
> > possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum
> > states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all
possible
> > situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such
> > theories you ''always'' exist.
> >
> > But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer
just
> > before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has
> > tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there
are
> > many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this
experience.
> > So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss
plus
> > some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been
in
> > that plane to begin with.
> >
> > You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a
random
> > generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of
all
> > possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have
> > experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small
> > probability.
> >
> > How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through
time?
> > Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a
> > memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the
next
> > morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because
the
> > person waking up has the memory of going to bed.
> >
> > You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any
one
> > of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the
> > memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That
particular
> > state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ---- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
> > Van: "David Kwinter" <david.domain.name.hidden>
> > Aan: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> > Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM
> > Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor
> >
> >
> > > Another quickie:
> > >
> > > Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
> > > different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
> > >
> > > Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
> > > crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at
> > > least one outcome where I survived, that TO ME I will always survive
> > > other such life/death branches?
> > >
> > > Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that
> > > the victim will survive in their own "world" so far as at least one
> > > quantum branch of survivability seems possible?
> > >
> > >
> > > David Kwinter
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Received on Mon Nov 03 2003 - 07:28:41 PST