re:Re: The universe consists of patterns of arrangement of 0's and 1's?

From: Marchal Bruno <>
Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2002 11:44:42 +0100 (MET)

Stephen Paul King <> wrote:

>I agree completely with that aspect of Bruno's thesis. ;-) It is the
>assumption that the 0's and 1's can exist without some substrate that
>bothers me. If we insist on making such an assuption, how can we even have a
>notion of distinguishability between a 0 and a 1?.
> To me, its analogous to claiming that Mody Dick "exists" but there does
>not exists any copies of it. If we are going to claim that "all possible
>computations" exists, then why is it problematic to imagine that "all
>possible implementations of computations" exists as well.

But then you need to explain what "implemention" are. Computer scientist
have no problem with this. There are nice mathematical formulation of it.
Tim would say that an implementation is basically a functor between categories.
You seen to want a material preeminent level, but this is more a source
of difficulty than an explanation. What is that level?

>Hardware is not an
>"epiphenomena" of software nor software an "epiphenomena" of hardware, they
>are very different and yet interdependent entities.

That is dualism. No problem, but incompatible with comp. If you want
comp, tell me where you stop in the UDA.

> Additionally, the 1-uncertainty notion seems to require a neglect of the
>no-cloning theorem of QM or, equivalently, that its ok for TMs to construct
>(via UDA) QM theories of themselves and yet not be subject to the rules of
>the theory.

No problem with the no-cloning theorem. Even if Hameroff is right, and brain
are quantum computer will the uda go through. Indeed the ud emulates
all quantum digital machine in many copies, and the laws of physics will
still be derivable by an average on many computations. In fact the comp
interpretation of the no-cloning theorem is that our neighborhoods relies
on all computations. to duplicate exactly a part of that neighborhoods, we
really have to duplicate the whole set of "all-computations", which is
certainly impossible from inside.

>Could we not recover 1-uncertainty from the Kochen-Specker
>theorem of QM itself?

Probably so.

Received on Fri Nov 29 2002 - 05:45:02 PST

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