Re: Doomsday-like argument in cosmology

From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2002 00:26:10 +0200

I haven't read the paper in detail, so I could be wrong. Consider the two
alternatives:

1) true cosmological constant

2) no true cosmological constant

We also assume SIA. Is it the case that there are much fewer observers in
case of 2) than in case of 1) ? I haven't seen such a statement in the paper
(but again, I could have missed it).

So, I would say that given our observations of the universe a probability
shift takes place, such that 2) is favored (assuming that 1) and 2) have a
priory probabilities of the same order).

Saibal

----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
Van: "Wei Dai" <weidai.domain.name.hidden>
Aan: "Saibal Mitra" <smitra.domain.name.hidden>
CC: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Verzonden: donderdag 15 augustus 2002 23:46
Onderwerp: Re: Doomsday-like argument in cosmology


> On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 11:28:28PM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > I think that the difference is that invoking the SIA does not affect
the
> > conclusion of the paper.
>
> Why do you say that? I think SIA affects the conclusion of the paper the
> same way it affects the Doomsday argument.
>
> It's kind of funny that the authors of this paper is playing the role of
> the presumptuous philosopher (in the thought experiment I just discussed
> in a previous post), except they're physicists, and they're making the
> opposite argument (in favor of the hypothesis that implies fewer observers
> rather than the one that implies more observers).
>
Received on Thu Aug 15 2002 - 15:28:50 PDT