I think that the difference is that invoking the SIA does not affect the
conclusion of the paper.
Saibal
Wei Dai wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 15, 2002 at 12:45:17AM -0400, Spudboy100.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> > Dyson, L., Kleban, M. & Susskind, L. Disturbing implications of a
> > cosmological constant. Preprint
<
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/hep-th/0208013>,
> > (2002).
>
> This is a variant on the Doomsday argument. The core argument of the paper
> is this:
>
> If we live in a world with a true cosmological constant, then the
> observers whose observable universe is macroscopically indistinguishable
> from ours are a tiny fraction of all observers. Therefore "the only
> reasonable conclusion is that we do not live in a world with a true
> cosmological constant."
>
> Compare this with the Doomsday argument (see
> http://www.anthropic-principle.com/primer1.html):
>
> If we live in a world without a doomsday in the near future, then the
> observers whose birth ranks are similar to ours are a tiny fraction of all
> observers. Therefore the only reasonble conclusion is that we do not live
> in a world without a doomsday in the near future.
>
> So you should accept the conclusion of this paper only if you think
> the Doomsday type of argument is sound.
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
>
>
Received on Thu Aug 15 2002 - 14:31:43 PDT