Re: real and virtual

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2002 20:10:48 +0200

Hi Lennart,

Be careful to reply-to-all, the reply mode in this list in not the
same as in the FOR-list.

LN:
>If you mean that one has to take into consideration all virtual
>reconstructions and computational stories in considering one's
>likely future, sure, but each and everyone of those virtual
>realities has a physical intrepetation

BM:
What is a physical interpretation? In what sense that physical
interpretation will makes your computational continuations having more
weight than the continua of computational continuations existing in UD*
How could a first person perspective be different in an arithmetical
interpretation, and a virtual? How do you relate the first person
experience and the "physical reality"?

LN:
> as the virtual machine itself..I guess you would call that the
>local 3-person view...if that is the same as the realist idea of
>something objectively existing that "kicks back"..then fine


BM:
The reality of numbers kick back enough from the point of view of machines
embedded (in multiple ways) in arithmetical reality.

Relatively to the matter part of the mind body problem, you are using
the idea of "physical reality" like vitalist were using the principle
of vital force in biology.

I don't doubt the evidence that we share histories in a relatively
stable decor. But with comp the stability must be explained by
relatively high measure of similar computational histories.

Surely you could agree that if physics is derived by such a measure, then
by OCCAM, that would be an evidence for "pure" comp. It would give
a simpler theory than actual physical toes.

But you can also look for the 1989 MAUDLIN paper (or my thesis or 1988
paper) for a direct argument (without OCCAM) making difficult to ascertain
both "materialism" and comp. I will look in the archive for the
adress of the discussion we already have about that).
Weak form of physicalism are still possibly recoverable with "low" mechanist
level of substitution.

Actually, I search to understand the physical without postulating it,
like I search to understand intelligence and consciousness without
postulating it too. Comp, like Everett partially, connects them without
magic relations. I will think about a better eleventh step, though.
(Without OCCAM it could be just the entire Movie-Graph/Maudlin's Olympia
argument).

If someone can explain more simply to Lennart why we don't need to
run the UD, please feel free ...

It is a subtler point than Tegmark or Shmidhuber seems to realize, imo.
But invoking some "real materiality" makes both matter and mind obscure.
The difficulty is that we anticipate such a naive model automatically
since a very long "shared internal time". Sure.

Regards,

Bruno
Received on Sat Jul 27 2002 - 11:12:40 PDT