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From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 12:05:02 +0200

Hal Finney wrote:

*>Then we can apply the same rule to conscious observers. We can define
*

*>a conscious observer as a particular computational structure, and if we
*

*>can locate such a structure inside the program output that corresponds
*

*>to a universe, then we can say that the observer is inside that universe.
*

*>This seems to be a much more naive and literal interpretation of the all
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*>universe model than what most of our contributors have been discussing
*

*>lately. Are there flaws in this simple formulation which require a more
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*>subtle approach?
*

I said, (and I guess I could say a little more).

<<I would say the flaws are both in the too much static view of a computer

output programs, where I think "universe" are first person emergent on the

running of all computations.>>

The fact is that you cannot simply define an observer with a particular

computational structure. You can, perhaps, attribute a mind or even a soul

to some apparently unique (from your *point of view*) implementation, but

the implementation instantiation, or incarnation, boundary is never clearly

defined.

What is implemented is neither well defined too, beyond saying that

it is an implementation of an actual relative computational state belonging

to some computational history (running of a program).

But from the point of view of the *conscious* observer there is

an intrinsical ignorance (for sound machine) about *which* histories

he/it/she/they participate, and the uda thougth experiment shows that in

some sense we belong to all, but we differentiate along consistent many path.

We face a measure problem. Actually we face two measure problems, due to

the 1/3 distinction.

I have use the Godel-Lob-Solovay logics just

for tranlating that measure problem in the language of a universal (Turing)

machine, and this leads to some very weaker sort of quantum logic.

-Bruno

Received on Fri Jul 05 2002 - 03:02:51 PDT

Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 12:05:02 +0200

Hal Finney wrote:

I said, (and I guess I could say a little more).

<<I would say the flaws are both in the too much static view of a computer

output programs, where I think "universe" are first person emergent on the

running of all computations.>>

The fact is that you cannot simply define an observer with a particular

computational structure. You can, perhaps, attribute a mind or even a soul

to some apparently unique (from your *point of view*) implementation, but

the implementation instantiation, or incarnation, boundary is never clearly

defined.

What is implemented is neither well defined too, beyond saying that

it is an implementation of an actual relative computational state belonging

to some computational history (running of a program).

But from the point of view of the *conscious* observer there is

an intrinsical ignorance (for sound machine) about *which* histories

he/it/she/they participate, and the uda thougth experiment shows that in

some sense we belong to all, but we differentiate along consistent many path.

We face a measure problem. Actually we face two measure problems, due to

the 1/3 distinction.

I have use the Godel-Lob-Solovay logics just

for tranlating that measure problem in the language of a universal (Turing)

machine, and this leads to some very weaker sort of quantum logic.

-Bruno

Received on Fri Jul 05 2002 - 03:02:51 PDT

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