Re: Draft Philosophy Paper

From: H J Ruhl <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 20:57:19 -0800

At 2/21/02, you wrote:
>If you are saying that it is the uncountability itself of copies that
>imparts indeterminacy, or changes the preponderancy, then effectively you
>are also saying that random selections from all the reals between -1 and +10
>do not converge towards a ratio of 10:1 for positive to negative values - I
>can't see what other result is possible.

That is you model and it is one dimensional [call it x] that is it has one
venue.
Now add a dimension call it y that is infinite and perpendicular to your
example's x. This is an infinite number of venues. Now randomly sample on
the xy plane. The area of the plane below zero on the x dimension is the
same as the area above zero on the x dimension i.e. infinite = no bias as
to sign mix of the resulting random sample of reals on x.

snip


>there is no more
>necessity to have no preponderance of any particular type of physical
>universe than to have no preponderance of a particular type of galaxy, or
>grain of sand.

With this I disagree when describing the Everything because on its face it
attempts to extract information from an informationless source. Your
example from within a particular universe [intrinsic information] is not
applicable because here its any style you want.


>(Note also that copies in the sense referred to in the paper would not be
>produced by any 'nested Everything' (assuming they are a legitimate
>possibility) -

With this I would agree, mine is not a one venue model.

>each different possible nested Everything would have to be a
>different state, for which there may or may not be copies, dependent on the
>correct interpretation of NAP.)

What you seem to be saying re my approach using the above analysis of your
example is that the boundaries of the plane in the y dimension may
meander. With this I agree. Actually its essential. So what? The areas
above and below the x = 0 line are still equal.

Hal
Received on Thu Feb 21 2002 - 18:02:02 PST

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