At 1/23/02, you wrote:
>H J Ruhl wrote:
> >
> > I have the following question regarding Juergen's paper:
> >
> > In the very first sentence of the abstract it is assumed that universes
> > have histories. If by this it is meant that a particular universe has a
> > particular unique identifiable history does this not mean that that
> > universe is computable?
>
>
>Why should it? It seems a universe's history is the only property a
>universe can have, ie universes are histories.
I do not see that at all. Why does it need a history? All it needs is the
capability of finding a next state.
>There are plenty of
>noncomputable descriptions that can serve as histories - for example
>the binary expansion of Chaitin's Omega.
That was not my point. The initial state of a universe is not computable -
it just was. The point is the method of association of any history with a
particular universe.
As to your example how would you parse it into segments each describing a
state of the universe? The universe may be doing so and thus computing
Omega and not know it. This as I understand it is possible for non halting
computers since no selection to compute Omega was made.
Hal
Received on Tue Jan 22 2002 - 18:22:19 PST
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