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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri Jan 18 07:39:05 2002

Wei Dai wrote:

*>I'm not sure why it's hard to understand. I've concluded that it's not
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*>always possible to make rational decisions based only on expected first
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*>person experiences. Instead you must take into account the consequences of
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*>your actions on the entire multiverse, even the parts of it that you don't
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*>expect to observe. Then I went back and asked myself, if decision theory
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*>is based on the third-person point of view, do we even need a concept of
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*>expected first person experiences? I think the answer is no, which is good
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*>because those issues I brought up earlier about problems with defining
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*>probability of first person experiences were never resolved and I don't
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*>think are resolvable.
*

We will discussed that later, but you know that I pretend (at least)

that from the UDA, we "just" need to find a relative measure on our

consistent extensions. That those extensions have a non trivial

structure is a consequence of the non trivial nature of self-reference

with sound UTMs, and that's what I have expoited in the Arithmetical

version of the UDA.

*>Are you saying that you believe the ratios in the infinite will be the
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*>same, but you don't have a proof of that yet?
*

It is a consequence of both comp and the "compiler" theorem (to

simplify a little bit). But comp could be false you know.

I'm just saying that if comp is true then such first person measure

should exist. If someone show such measures cannot exist then comp

will be refuted. Now AUDA is promising by showing a solid step

toward an indirect isolation of such a measure, and by showing it

behaves like the quantum measure.

Sometimes you talk like if you don't accept even the quantum

measure/probability (independently of its 1 or 3 person roots).

*>Think about it from the third person point of view. Why are you rationally
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*>bound to treat each of your extensions equally? Why can't you care about
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*>some of them more than others?
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Because I am in a state of maximal ignorance about all of them.

It is the same reason which makes me expect a 1/2 lowering of intensity

of a beam of light described by 1/sqr(2)(up + down) going through

a up-measurement apparatus.

Bruno

Received on Fri Jan 18 2002 - 07:39:05 PST

Date: Fri Jan 18 07:39:05 2002

Wei Dai wrote:

We will discussed that later, but you know that I pretend (at least)

that from the UDA, we "just" need to find a relative measure on our

consistent extensions. That those extensions have a non trivial

structure is a consequence of the non trivial nature of self-reference

with sound UTMs, and that's what I have expoited in the Arithmetical

version of the UDA.

It is a consequence of both comp and the "compiler" theorem (to

simplify a little bit). But comp could be false you know.

I'm just saying that if comp is true then such first person measure

should exist. If someone show such measures cannot exist then comp

will be refuted. Now AUDA is promising by showing a solid step

toward an indirect isolation of such a measure, and by showing it

behaves like the quantum measure.

Sometimes you talk like if you don't accept even the quantum

measure/probability (independently of its 1 or 3 person roots).

Because I am in a state of maximal ignorance about all of them.

It is the same reason which makes me expect a 1/2 lowering of intensity

of a beam of light described by 1/sqr(2)(up + down) going through

a up-measurement apparatus.

Bruno

Received on Fri Jan 18 2002 - 07:39:05 PST

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