This sounds to me that you're coming around to Jacque's ASSA
position...
Even assuming your ideas about lack of continuity are correct, each
observer moment perceived must be consistent with its history. In
order to make "discontinuous" jumps across the Multiverse (and I'm
sure Jacques hates that term :), information must be lost by the
observer. I would think that there must be some kind of parsimony on
how this is done, severely restricting the kinds of "jumps" possible.
More likely, (and this would now be the RSSA type of interpretation),
as continuous transitions become more unlikely (ie escaping death becomes
extremely less likely), then forgetting style discontinuous
transitions might dominate.
I can believe that this argument will prevent us from entering "Harry
Potter" type universes through Quantum Suicide, but one will probably
still be able to make a buck out of a suitably structured lottery.
Does this mean that we're likely to see arbitrarily large ages? I'm no
entirely sure your argument resolves this issue, but I'm still
planning to celebrate my 200th birthday with a virtual champagne toast
(since I will most likely be a disembodied brain connected to a life
support system :).
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
>
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>
> I am now completely convinced that attempts to witness low probability =
> events or to travel to low measure sectors of the plenitude are doomed =
> to failure.
>
> The (hidden) assumption behind quantum suicide is that of continuity of =
> consciousness: If there is only one unlikely outcome that will preserve =
> one's consciousness, then that is what will happen as observed by the =
> person himself.
>
> But why should this be true? Even if the probability were exactly zero =
> for the person's consciousness to be preserved, the person will always =
> find himself alive somewhere in the plenitude. And therefore he will =
> always experience his consciousness to be continuous.
>
> As I see it, the plenitude contains a set of states a particular =
> observer can be in. Each element has a certain a priory probability, =
> depending on the details of the structure of the plenitude.
> =20
> If we are dealing with immortal observers, then this probability must =
> be conserved. I.e. if an experiment has three outcomes (a, b, c), the =
> sum of the a priory probabilities of the observer observing event a, b, =
> and c, must equal the a priory probability of the observer being in the =
> state before performing the experiment.
>
> In case of a mortal observer, however, the probability is not conserved =
> (from the observer's perspective). This is nothing but the definition of =
> being mortal.
>
> I claim that one might just as well consider all states the observer =
> could possibly be in as independent, the particular state he is in drawn =
> randomly from the a priory probability distribution. It really doesn't =
> matter. Consciousness will stil be experienced as continiuous from the =
> perspective of the observer. We don't have to put this in by hand. There =
> is no such thing as a conservation of consciousness. There is a =
> conservation of probability from the third person's perspective, which =
> doesn't always translate into a conservation of probability from the =
> first person's perspective.
>
> The suicide machine thus can't work. The probability of winning the =
> lottery, given that you have just boarded the suicide machine, is simply =
> the a priory probability of experiencing the desired outcome divided by =
> the a priory probability of just having boarded the suicide machine. The =
> probability of winning is thus unaffected.
>
> Saibal
>
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> <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
> <HTML><HEAD>
> <META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
> http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
> <META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2614.3500" name=3DGENERATOR>
> <STYLE></STYLE>
> </HEAD>
> <BODY bgColor=3D#b8b8b8>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I am now completely convinced that =
> attempts to=20
> witness low probability events or to travel to low measure sectors of =
> the=20
> plenitude are doomed to failure.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The (hidden) assumption behind quantum =
> suicide is=20
> that of continuity of consciousness: If there is only one unlikely =
> outcome that=20
> will preserve one's consciousness, then that is what will happen as =
> observed by=20
> the person himself.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>But why should this be true? Even if =
> the=20
> probability were exactly zero for the person's consciousness to be =
> preserved,=20
> the person will always find himself alive somewhere in the plenitude. =
> And=20
> therefore he will always experience his consciousness to be=20
> continuous.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>As I see it, the plenitude contains a =
> set of states=20
> a particular observer can be in. Each element has a certain a priory=20
> probability, depending on the details of the structure of the=20
> plenitude.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2> If we are dealing with immortal =
> observers,=20
> then this probability must be conserved. I.e. if an experiment has three =
>
> outcomes (a, b, c), the sum of the a priory probabilities of the =
> observer=20
> observing event a, b, and c, must equal the a priory probability of =
> the=20
> observer being in the state before performing the =
> experiment.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>In case of a mortal observer, however, =
> the=20
> probability is not conserved (from the observer's perspective). This is =
> nothing=20
> but the definition of being mortal.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>I claim that one might just as well =
> consider all=20
> states the observer could possibly be in as independent, the particular =
> state he=20
> is in drawn randomly from the a priory probability distribution. It =
> really=20
> doesn't matter. Consciousness will stil be experienced as continiuous =
> from the=20
> perspective of the observer. We don't have to put this in by hand. There =
> is no=20
> such thing as a conservation of consciousness. There is a conservation =
> of=20
> probability from the third person's perspective, which doesn't always =
> translate=20
> into a conservation of probability from the first person's=20
> perspective.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The suicide machine thus can't work. =
> The=20
> probability of winning the lottery, given that you have just boarded the =
> suicide=20
> machine, is simply the a priory probability of experiencing the desired =
> outcome=20
> divided by the a priory probability of just having boarded the suicide =
> machine.=20
> The probability of winning is thus unaffected.</FONT></DIV>
> <DIV> </DIV>
> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Saibal</FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>
>
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Received on Tue Jan 01 2002 - 16:31:49 PST