Interesting, although I suspect the interpretation of "the ability to
do somehthing completely stupid" is more like asserting the truth of
an unprovable statement than asserting the truth of a false
statement. In modal logic, this would be (x & -[]x ) n'est-ce pas?
Note an automaton cannot assert the truth of anything not provable
from its axioms...
Cheers
Marchal wrote:
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> >As I am bound to paraphrase, Free Will is the ability to do somehthing
> >completely stupid!
>
> Would you accept:
>
> Freedom is the right to deny 2 + 2 = 5.
> (cf. George Orwell torture scene in 1984)
> Free Will is the right to say 2 + 2 = 5
> (cf. Russell Standish) ?
>
>
> Interpreting freely "to deny 2 + 2 = 5" by -[]f ( f = FALSE or "0 = 1")
> and "to say 2 + 2 = 5" by []f, you get through Orwell + Standish,
> this "interpretation" of Godel:
>
> Freedom makes Free Will consistent. (-[]f -> <>[]f)
>
> (Or the inconsistency of free will entails no freedom).
>
> I am guessing you give a good definition of free-will, at least for
> the "non stupid" (sound) machines.
> For the "stupid" one (those inconsistent really believing that 2 + 2 = 5
> or
> some equivalent proposition) it is not clear if their stupid acts will
> bear
> any witness to free-will.
>
> Perhaps free will is the ability to do something we *bet* as being
> completely stupid, and freedom is the ability of *not*
> doing that completely stupid thing?
>
> when George Levy said
>
> >> Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive
> >> ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes.
> >> When the decision is clear then free will is really not an issue. Free
> >> will becomes important when the decision factors are close to being
> >> evenly split. In those cases, before a decision is made, there is no way
> >> to know what this decision will be unless one makes the decision. If
> >> someone asked you why did you choose this, you wouldn't be able to say.
> >> This is free will.
>
> I tend to disagree. When the decision factors are close to being
> evenly split, then I cannot choose and let the first circumstance
> choose for me. No need of free will. Following Russell I would say that
> free will could perhaps be the ability of choosing what seems to be the
> stupider choice, ... and freedom could perhaps be the ability to reject
> that stupider solution. I should think a little more about that.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Received on Tue Oct 23 2001 - 17:46:01 PDT