George Levy wrote:
> Pete Carlton wrote:
> >
> >
> > George Levy wrote:
> >
> > > <snip>
> > > Free will is also relativistic. A consciousness gives the impression of
> > > having free will if its behavior is unpredicatble (ineffable -
> > > unprovable) BY THE OBSERVER. The self gives the impression to the
> > > OBSERVING SELF of having free will because the self cannot predict what
> > > its own behavior will be.
>
> There are two ways of observing free will: free will in others and free
> will in self.
Is this view issued from an already established context? These ideas of free
will
seem to rely on the assumption of cause, effect, and time.
>
>
> Let's first discuss free will in others. It is obvious that if someone
> else's behavior is so clear and so totally predictable that it appears
> to the observer to be following a "program" then the person has no free
> will. In the limit, consider the case of a programmer (the observer)
> observing the behavior of a program he has just written. Assuming that
> the observer is an intelligent programmer and knows what is is doing,
> then the program is an "open book" to him. The program obiously has no
> free will.
Or the program is the one with free will, and the observer is the one without
it.
>
>
> It may be the case however, that the programmer is programming a very
> complex program or even a neural net and that there is no simple logical
> links between the program steps (a neural nets has no program steps).
> The program may then do things which are unexpected to the programmer.
> At that point the programmer may think that the program has free will.
Again I assert that one could view animation in this (physical) observation
frame as an illusion. One could assume all possible states of the neural net
already exist. What might be called consciousness, is simply an entity that
walks this possibility or expression space to find expression in the physical
frame.
>
>
> Free will stems from perceived indeterminacy in the behavior of a person
> or a program. This indeterminacy could either be physical in nature
> (quantics) or mathematical (Godelian). I believe that both physical
> indeterminacy and mathematical indeterminacy will eventually be proven
> to be identical. Bruno Marchal may be on his way to doing this. I think
> that Godel ndeterminacy could be made relativistic: it could depend on
> the axiomatic system used, with an arbitrary number of systems rather
> than the only two systems suggested by Bruno: G and G*. Unfortunately I
> am not a good enough mathematician to carry out this task.
>
> Now let's look at observing free will in the self. Do we perceive
> ourselves to be indeterminate in our behavior? Absolutely sometimes.
> When the decision is clear then free will is really not an issue. Free
> will becomes important when the decision factors are close to being
> evenly split. In those cases, before a decision is made, there is no way
> to know what this decision will be unless one makes the decision. If
> someone asked you why did you choose this, you wouldn't be able to say.
> This is free will.
>
> George
One could say that all apparent threads of expression already happened,
and that it is our limited observation powers that make it appear as though
sequential decision making is the true expression of awareness.
It might be that the expression of will for an individual took place as one
thought in a timeless realm such that the decision or assertion of free
will encompassed the entire apparent sequential thread in the physical
context.
One way to look at this would be to imagine a dna strand wrapped up
in a gene. The strand is first coiled, then that coil is coiled, and so on. I
don't recall how many times coils are made to form coils in a gene.
Now imagine that our physical expression looks like a straight line. Take
that line or thread and coil it. Now, from one observer's viewpoint, he's
going in a straight line through time. If one was to modify his consciousness,
he could step outside the line and see what he had been perceiving as a coil.
He can now traverse the coil itself like a straight line. Now imagine the
process
repeated again, the coil is used to form another coil. The observer could step
back still further and see this new composite coil as his linear expression.
Another analogy might be one were you have characters in a movie, people
watching the movie, and people making a movie. The characters in the movie
have no idea that their course has been set outside their observation space.
The people in the theater watching the movie realize that the course of
expression
for the characters in the movie is set, but have no control over the course
either.
The people making the movie have full control and observation powers. They
are the characters, they are the observers, and they are the creators of the
course of expression or movie.
I assert that free will has more to do with navigating this space of
perception
and picking which movie you'll watch rather than what is expressed by any
character in the movie.
Robert W.
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Received on Tue Oct 23 2001 - 13:19:45 PDT