Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability

From: Marchal <>
Date: Mon Oct 15 07:39:42 2001

Zbigniew Motyka wrote:


>It would be not polite from my side to express any opinion about UDA before
>I really make acquaintance with it.

Thanks. I whish everyone were like you :-)

>For now I may only repeat: When you start from some suitable axiomatic
>positions, you may prove almost everything using all rules of logic. I am
>afraid that UDA may start from such positions from very beginning.

I could aknowledge it. Most who understand the UDA just throw out comp.
I just show COMP entails sort of weirdness (experimentaly verifiable)
A case is made that quantum weirdness is part of comp weirdness.

By comp I mean really three things:
1) There is a level of description of myself such that I can survive
through a digital emulation of myself at that level.
2) Church (Kleene, Post, Turing, Markov) Thesis.
3) Arithmetical Platonism (proposition like "17 is prime" of FERMAT are
true independently of my or ours knowledge of them).

I don't postulate there is a universe, still less a computable universe.
I just don't know, but I don't need it. It could happen that a maximal
universal covering for dense subset of computational histories can be
eventually be isolated, it would then define a natural "unique"
multiverse, but at first sight the arithmetical translation is not
going in that direction. But then it is not yet clear (imo) that the
MWI makes possible classical realism too ...

>But... I
>promised, I see. Though, my opinion should not be anything binding for you,
>of course.

Obviously, I would be more interested if you found a serious failure :)

>I am just rank physicist and maybe too aventurous for this rank.

The UDA needs only some imagination and passive knowledge of computer
The translation of the UDA in arithmetic, and its use for extracting
the logic of the "measure 1" out of the (arithmetical) geometry of the
consistent computational extensions, need familiarity with both logic and
physics. (It's technical).

Received on Mon Oct 15 2001 - 07:39:42 PDT

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